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ABSTRACT
Using Jowett and O’Donnell’s system of propaganda analysis, the present case study
concentrates on America’s dominant propaganda messages, techniques, and media channels used
in Iran during the time period between 1951 and 1953. The chosen period is of historical
significance since it entails the Iranian nationalization of oil crisis and the 1953 coup against the
government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. The coup was the first CIA-sponsored
covert operation against a foreign government and served as a model for subsequent operations
elsewhere.
An examination of the official correspondence of the major U.S. actors involved, as
documented in the tenth volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series, reveals that
the primary objective of U.S. policy in Iran was to maintain Western control of the country’s oil
resources as a means to curb Soviet power in the region. American officials realized that
nationalism was a real and potent force in the country and that Mosaddeq enjoyed overwhelming
public support. Frustrated with the failure of a negotiated settlement, the Truman administration
began to secretly plan for covert action. The coup was eventually implemented under the
Eisenhower administration.
The nationalistic nature of Iranian public opinion which equated Russian and British
forms of imperialism ran counter to American policies in the region. To mitigate this counterproductive mentality, the United States planned its propaganda programs to raise the desire of
the Iranian people to resist communism. Thus, in the three years before the coup, U.S.
propaganda messages concentrated on spreading an anti-communist ideology.
In the months preceding the coup, the United States spent more than $1,000,000 in part to
buy the allegiance of influential Iranian figures, such as deputies of the parliament, and to
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purchase the services of the controllable Iranian press. The CIA relied on black propaganda to
reduce Mosaddeq’s popularity and legitimacy by, among other things, alleging that his actions
were in line with the Tudeh Party (the Iranian communist party) and that he was an anti-religious
individual. As a whole, the thesis shows the centrality of propaganda to U.S. foreign policy.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
The Cold War inaugurated a paradigm shift in the U.S. practice of diplomacy that
reflected changes in the nature of diplomatic activity worldwide. Through propaganda,
policy initiatives, and covert action, agents of the U.S. government acted directly to
influence the ideas, values, beliefs, opinions, actions, policies, and culture of other
countries. Foreign affairs personnel not only observed and reported, they also
participated in events or tried to influence the way that they happened. The old maxim
that one government does not interfere in the internal affairs of another had been swept
aside. 1
The above paragraph is illustrative of the policies and events that led to the 1953 AngloAmerican coup in Iran against the popular government of Mohammad Mosaddeq in which the
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) propaganda played an instrumental role. 2 What the United
States believed appropriate based on America’s global interests set the stage for generations of
anti-American feelings among Iranians. 3 In the post-9/11 years, when many Americans are
asking “why do they hate us?” it is vital to recognize “that the character and exercise of
American power in the world must form a critical part of any objective analysis of antiAmericanism.” 4
In an interview on Democracy Now, Stephen Kinzer, New York Times reporter and
author of All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, 5 makes a
connection between what happened in 1953 and the Iranian takeover of the American embassy in
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1980. 6 Based on his earlier conversation with Bruce Laingen, the senior American official held
hostage, Kinzer observes, “People in Iran are thinking, ‘It’s all happening again. CIA agents
working in the basement of the American embassy are going to organize a coup, and they’re
going to bring the Shah back. We have to prevent 1953 from happening again.’”7
In a March 17, 2000, address to the American-Iranian Council, then U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright acknowledged the repercussions of the Anglo-American coup in this
way:
In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of
Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh (sic). The Eisenhower
administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was
clearly a setback for Iran’s political development and it is easy to see now why many
Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.
Moreover, during the next quarter century, the United States and the West gave sustained
backing to the Shah’s regime. Although it did much to develop the country economically,
the Shah’s government also brutally repressed political dissent. 8
The events of the 1953 coup have been the subject of several scholarly articles and books,
but no study has focused on analyzing the propaganda aspect of the operation. This is while
propaganda was critical to the success of the coup. 9 This thesis will thus focus on American
propaganda activities in Iran between 1951 and 1953. Using Jowett and O’Donnell’s 10-step
system of propaganda analysis, the case study concentrates on America’s dominant propaganda
messages, techniques, and media channels used during this time period. 10 The thesis is confined
to these three years for two main reasons. Doing so limits its scope, making the task more
manageable and practical. But more importantly, the chosen period is of historical significance,
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since it entails the Iranian nationalization of oil crisis and the 1953 Anglo-American-sponsored
coup. Before conducting the study, I present a brief historical context for the 1953 coup.

Historical Context: The Road to the Coup
With the decline of the Iranian empire in early 19th century and the growth of colonial
powers at its borders, Iran became the scene of great power rivalry. Although never officially
colonized, Iran found itself at the intersection of Russian, British, and French imperial incursions
in the region and later became the subject of economic exploitation permitted at the hands of its
autocratic monarchy. Prior to World War II, it was the British and Russian governments who
were deeply involved in Iranian affairs. Upon losing two wars with Russia in the early 19th
century, Iran ceded a large part of its northern territory. Iran also fought a war with Britain in the
mid 19th century and gave up the Herat region in western Afghanistan after recognizing Afghan
independence. 11 Figure 1 shows the map of Iran during the 19th century. Figure 2 shows a map
of modern Iran.
This great power rivalry “also took the form of economic penetration.” 12 As Mowlana
observes, “the 19th century became a buyers’ market for commercial concessions as the shahs
discovered that their extravaganzas could be financed in this fashion.” 13 In 1863, Nasir ad-Din
Shah of the Qajar dynasty (who ruled Iran from 1848 until 1896) began an increasingly
extravagant trend of privatizing the country’s economic resources according to which foreign
states or individuals gained exclusive rights to the exploitation of a natural resource or
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industry. 14 In return, they agreed to give a royalty back to the state, payments that were small in
relation to the profits gained. 15

Figure 1. Map of Iran during the 19th century
Russians received a series of major concessions, “including a monopoly to fish for
sturgeon (the source of the delicacy, caviar) in the Caspian Sea and exemption from import
duties, internal tariffs, and the jurisdiction of local courts.” 16 The British Imperial Bank got the
exclusive rights to issue paper money. In 1863, a British company got a major concession to
14
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extend telegraph lines through Iran to India. In 1872, Baron Julius de Reuter, a British
naturalized citizen and banker, obtained an expansive concession for the right to “construct
railways and streetcar lines, to exploit minerals and oil for a period of 70 years, and to manage
the customs services for 24 years.” 17 The Reuter concession was eventually cancelled as a result
of pressure from Russia, Reuter’s inability to secure a loan from Britain, and widespread
domestic opposition to such a wholesale surrender of the country’s natural resources. 18

Figure 2. Map of modern Iran
The Qajar shahs also borrowed heavily from foreign banks. By the turn of the century,
these loans had become so heavy that the shah of the time had to turn over Iran’s entire customs
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service to European supervision. Foreign takeover of the country’s economy resulted in growing
popular resentment, culminating in the constitutional revolution of 1905-1909. 19
What could be considered the most significant concession of all was granted in 1901 to
William D’Arcy of Britain for oil and gas rights in all but the northern parts of Iran. In 1908,
D’Arcy’s company found substantial quantities of oil in Masjed-e Soleyman and established the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) the next year. APOC was later renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC). With the advent of World War I and the British navy’s conversion from coal
to oil, the British government bought 51 percent of the company’s stock and arranged for the
purchase of APOC oil at a discount. 20 By 1949-50, the AIOC had the world’s largest refinery at
Abadan. It was by then the second largest exporter of crude oil and had the third largest oil
reserves. AIOC was an extremely crucial asset to British power as it provided the British
Treasury with 24 million pounds sterling in taxes and 92 million pounds in foreign exchange
annually. Moreover, Iranian oil supplied 85 percent of the fuel needs of the British navy at a
discount rate. Iran received just 17 percent of the profits, which over the years did not even
amount to the taxes that the British Treasury had accrued. 21 Abadan and Masjed-e Soleyman
can be seen in Figure 3.
Beginning with World War I, Iran again became the site of Western power domination.
The nation was occupied during the two World Wars, in 1914 and in 1941. Despite Iran’s
declaration of neutrality, British and Russian armies (Soviets in World War II) entrapped Iran,
fearing that it might be used as a pro-German base against the Allies. Each time, Iran was
divided into two occupation zones, with a small neutral zone around Tehran run by Iran’s
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government. 22 “The U.S. entry into World War II resulted in the first large-scale involvement of
Americans in Iran”. 23 In 1942, the United States established the Persian Gulf Command (PGC)
to make efficient use of the Iranian transportation system for sending military equipment and
supplies to the Soviet Union. By 1944, some 30,000 American military and civilian personnel
worked for the PGC in Iran. 24

Figure 3. Map of contemporary southern Iranian oilfields
Tehran, the meeting place of the Big Three in 1943 and the link of military cooperation
between the American and Soviet forces, soon turned into the front line of the Cold War as U.S.Soviet tension solidified. Iran, along with Greece and Turkey, “constituted the first line of
defense of the Middle East against possible Soviet aggression.” 25
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In addition to its political significance, Iran’s large oil resources and Western powers’
dependence on British-run Iranian oil made the dynamics of Iranian politics ever more complex.
“For the British, Iranian oil was an economic as well as strategic asset.”26 For the United States,
“loss of Iranian oil production and of the refinery at Abadan” meant a drastic blow to “Western
economic and military interests,” as it would undermine Western Europe reconstruction and
weaken the position of the so-called “free world” against the Soviet Union. 27 Also, Iran served
as the only land barrier between the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Persian Gulf, a fact that made
Iran “a vital link in the Western security chain.” 28 Consequently, Iranian nationalism was in
sharp contrast to the strategic interests of Western powers.
Iran was the first country in the Middle East to struggle to gain control of its oil industry.
The origins of the oil dispute go back to the aftermath of World War II when in 1948 Iran’s
parliament rejected an earlier Russian proposal for an oil concession in northern Iran. 29 While
the nationalist members of the parliament (i.e., members of the National Front political party,
including Mosaddeq) originated this legislation, the “Anglophile” members, as Ruhollah
Hoseinian refers to members who sympathized with the British, played a pivotal role in the
passage of the bill. 30 Their aim was to curb Russian influence in Iran. The “Russophile”
members, those who sympathized with the Soviet Union, retaliated with a bill to repeal the 1933
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oil contract with Britain. According to Hoseinian, Mosaddeq initially was against the bill, citing
the legal implications of unilaterally breaking the contract. 31
The bill was revived as a result of the parliament’s opposition to the Supplemental Oil
agreement of 1949 in which Britain agreed to increase Iranian royalties from 17 to 24 percent.
This was “too little, too late.” 32 Moreover, the new agreement did not address other Iranian
grievances such as Britain’s refusal to promote Iranians to technical and managerial positions,
the selling of oil to the British navy at a substantial discount, and the long duration of the
contract (i.e., to 1993). This time, the members of the National Front Party, including
Mosaddeq, were instrumental in obstructing the ratification of the contract through a filibuster.
The life of the fifteenth parliament ended as one of the members of the National Front was
speaking in opposition to the agreement.
Clerical leaders likewise played a prominent role in mobilizing public demand for the
nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. Ayatollah Abol Qasem Kashani was the leading cleric of
his time fighting against British imperialism in Iran, who had an instrumental role in
transforming the elitist struggle for the nationalization of oil industry in Iran into a popular
demand. 33 Between 1942 and 1951, he was repeatedly imprisoned and exiled. From his exile in
Iraq, Ayatollah Kashani issued a proclamation on December 21, 1950, published in the Shahed
newspaper, encouraging all “sincere Muslims and patriotic citizens to fight against the enemies
of Islam and Iran by joining the nationalization struggle.” 34 A few days later, on December 30,
Mosaddeq addressed a rally of 12,000 in Tehran, criticizing the government for its inadequate
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33
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demands from Britain. Mosaddeq stressed that the “conflict would not be resolved until the
entire oil industry was nationalized.” 35

Figure 4. A. Ayatollah Kashani. 36 B. Mosaddeq and friends, from left to right, Mozaffar
Baghai, Abolhassan Ha’erizadeh, Prime Minister Mosaddeq, Hossein Makki, and Abdolqadir
Azad 37
The struggle to nationalize Iran’s oil gained momentum upon assassination of Prime
Minister Razmara, who was approved to the post in June 1950 and had strongly opposed
nationalization. On March 3, 1951, just four days before his assassination Razmara had
addressed the Majlis (Iranian parliament) Oil Commission emphasizing the impracticality of
nationalization. 38 Shortly after, Ayatollah Kashani was allowed to return to Tehran from exile. 39
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On March 8, 1951, the sixteenth parliament passed a bill that nationalized the oil
industry. 40 Upon Razmara’s assassination, the Shah had named Hossein Ala the prime minister
of Iran. Ala resigned shortly after due to widespread opposition from the parliament and the
public. The Shah eventually agreed to Mosaddeq’s premiership after the Majlis voted in favor of
the choice on April 28, 1951. Mosaddeq accepted the premiership since he saw alternatives to
himself would most probably crush the nationalization movement. On May 1, he declared AIOC
assets nationalized and cancelled the company’s oil concession. A month later, Majlis sent a
committee of five of its deputies to Abadan to enforce the nationalization law. 41
Heiss observes that “the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute seemed irresolvable from the start” as
each party “saw the conflict through the prism of its own history and perspective, and neither
showed much willingness to compromise. 42 The Iranians expressed their political right to
control their country’s assets and their aspirations for national independence from foreign
influence; the British were fixated on the legal aspect of the equation. Britain stressed the
sanctity of international contracts and charged Iran was unilaterally breaking its contract with
AIOC. 43 What Iranian nationalists, led by Mosaddeq, wanted was not increased royalties, but
control over extraction, production, and distribution of oil. This was something the British could
not manage to withhold if Britain was to maintain its position as a world power. 44 Having no
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intention of ceding its domination of Iran’s oil resources, Britain organized a Western boycott of
Iranian oil, and succeeded in destabilizing the country’s economy. 45
Heiss highlights the role Orientalism played in U.S.-Iran relations during Mosaddeq’s era
in the early 1950s. 46 Orientalism is a Western-style of thought according to which the cultures
and peoples of the Orient are seen as inferior to Westerners and their way of life. 47 According to
Heiss, “The end result of the Orientalization of Mosaddeq was an increasingly rigid AngloAmerican position on the oil crisis that eschewed compromise or concessions and ultimately saw
removing him from office as the only acceptable course of action.” 48
Abrahamian relates the pervasiveness of Orientalist perceptions by British officials of
Iranians, in general, and Mosaddeq, in particular, in the following way:
British officials assured others, as well as themselves, that the National Front was
“nothing but a noisy bunch of malcontents”; that Mosaddeq – a “wily Oriental” – was
“wild,” “erratic,” “eccentric,” “crazy,” “gangster-like,” “fanatical,” “absurd,”
“dictatorial,” “demagogic,” “inflammatory,” and “single-mindedly obstinate”’ and that
Iranians were by nature “child-like,” “tiresome and headstrong,” “unwilling to accept
facts,” “volatile and unstable,” “sentimentally mystical,” “unprepared to listen to reason
and common sense,” and “swayed by emotions devoid of positive content.” 49
Abrahamian finds “these racial diatribes” not indicative of why the Iranian-British negotiations
broke down. 50 Rather, he finds them more reflective of the British frustration over the prospects
of losing control of Iranian oil, which could in turn result in a slippery slope of loss of control for
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its other Middle Eastern assets. “The impasse came not because of racial prejudices but because
of the clash of economic interests between imperialism and nationalism.” 51
“It was the inability of the British and the Iranians to resolve the oil dispute on their own
that ultimately brought the United States into the conflict.” 52 Frustrated with the failure of a
negotiated settlement, the United States opted for covert action. The CIA staged a coup in
August of 1953, marking America’s first covert operation against an elected government. 53 The
coup happened under the supervision of the CIA’s first director, Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969),
who, according to Cull, “had no doubt of the value of propaganda,” actively pursuing
propaganda projects such as funding anti-communist newspapers and magazines for influencing
target countries’ politics. 54
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CHAPTER II – METHODOLOGY
The methodology for this thesis is a qualitative case study. As Cunningham states,
historical description and qualitative case study is “the most widely exercised method of explicit
propaganda analysis.” 55 According to Yin, case study is the preferred research approach when
one is addressing questions of “how” and “why.” 56 Yin maintains that a unique strength of the
case study approach lies in its incorporation of a variety of evidence including documents,
archival evidence, artifacts, etc. While Yin restricts case studies to investigations of
contemporary phenomena, other scholars have not found such a narrow conceptualization
necessary. 57 For the purpose of this research, I define case study as the examination of “the
particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important
circumstances.” 58 The study employs Jowett and O’Donnell’s established propaganda model for
analyzing propaganda campaigns and focuses on U.S. propaganda activities in Iran in the period
between 1951 and 1953. 59

Jowett and O’Donnell’s System of Propaganda Analysis
Jowett and O’Donnell’s framework consists of 10 stages of propaganda analysis, each of
which examines a different aspect of the propaganda process – 1) ideology and purpose, 2)
context, 3) identification of the propagandist, 4) propaganda organization structure, 5) audience,
6) media utilized, 7) techniques used, 8) audience reaction, 9) counter-propaganda, and 10)
effects and evaluation. 60 According to the framework’s creators, the key strength of this method
lies in its consideration of the social climate in which propaganda is designed, executed, and
55
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received. Applying this methodology to the current case study allows the researcher to compile a
thorough and comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of early Cold War propaganda in the
context of the Iranian society. According to Jowett, the framework “sets out a matrix designed to
facilitate the examination of all the elements of a propaganda campaign from a broader
perspective and ‘as a flow of information’ within the sociocultural context.” 61 The following
excerpt from Jowett and O’Donnell encapsulates the objectives of the present case study:
To what ends, in the context of the times, does a propaganda agent, working through an
organization, reach an audience through the media while using special symbols to get a
desired reaction? Furthermore, if there is opposition to the propaganda, what form does it
take? Finally, how successful is the propaganda in achieving its purpose?” 62
More specifically, Jowett and O’Donnell suggest a number of questions to be asked for
each of the 10 steps in the propaganda analysis. 63 Since, as the authors point out, not all of these
questions are necessarily applicable to all propaganda situations, the following breakdown is
used as a guideline in the present case study.
1. Ideology and Purpose
1a: What are the ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign?
1b: Does the propaganda campaign aim to achieve integration or agitation?
2. Context
2a: In what socio-political context does the propaganda campaign take place? In
particular, what events and issues are identifiable?
2b: How does the propaganda organization construct the social reality of these events and
issues (interpretation of the context)?
2c: How do the propaganda activities aim to affect power relations?

61

Garth Jowett, "Toward a Propaganda Analysis of the Gulf War," in Desert Storm and the Mass Media, ed. B.
Greenberg and W. Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1997), 75.
62
Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 270.
63
Ibid.

15

3. Identification of the Propagandist
3a: Who is/are the propagandist(s)?
3b: Who has the most to gain from the propaganda campaign?
4. Structure of the Propaganda Organization
4a: What is the organizational set-up leading the propaganda campaign?
4b: How does the organizational leadership gain the allegiance of the subordinates?
4c: What are the ultimate objectives of the organization?
5. Target Audience
5a: Who are the targets for the propaganda messages?
5b: How and why are these audiences targeted?
6. Media Utilization Techniques
6a: What media are used to transmit the message?
6c: Does the propagandist(s) employ the media in a way that would conceal the purpose
of the campaign or the identity of the propagandist(s)?
7. Special Techniques to Maximize Effect
7a: What special techniques are used to maximize resonance with audience
predispositions?
7e: Are opinion leaders and personal communication employed to maximize effect?
7f: How are group norms utilized to the benefit of the propaganda campaign?
8. Audience Reaction to Various Techniques
8a: How does the target audience react to the propaganda campaign?
8b: Does this reaction help or hinder the realization of the goal of the propaganda
campaign?
9. Counterpropaganda
16

9a: How do the oppositional media react to the propaganda messages?
9b: How does the propagandist respond to and interpret the counterpropaganda to
minimize backlash?
10. Effects and Evaluation
10a: To what extent was the purpose of the propaganda fulfilled?

Data
The primary sources of information for this thesis consist of the available U.S. State
Department and CIA documents about United States foreign policy at work during the time
period under study. The available sources of information are three-fold. First, part of the data
for this study is retrieved from the collection of declassified documents on the U.S. propaganda
in the Middle East at the National Security Archive Web site. 64 National Security Archive is “an
independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington
University.” 65 Second, the thesis makes extensive use of another body of documents collected in
the tenth volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. 66 These series are
available online at the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center. 67 The volumes are
searchable.
The above two sources of documents comprise the official correspondence among the
many U.S. actors involved in the formation and implementation of U.S. policy in Iran during the
nationalization of oil controversy, including the president, secretary of state, other State
Department officials, U.S. ambassador in Iran, and other embassy personnel. Examining these
64
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sources of information gives the researcher a unique behind-the-scene look at the evolution of
U.S. policy, especially as it relates to U.S. propaganda activities and the eventual coup in August
of 1953.
Donald Wilber’s secret history of the CIA coup is another important primary source of
information for this study. 68 The full text of the document is available online at the National
Security Archive Web site. Donald Wilber, Middle East architecture expert, was an undercover
CIA agent who figured prominently in the planning and execution of the 1953 coup in Iran. He
headed the coup’s psychological operations team. “The 200-page CIA official history,”
according to Mark Gasiorowski, “adds considerably to our understanding of the coup.” 69
Wilber’s history, which was written exclusively for the intelligence community as a blueprint for
future similar covert operations, chronicles the events of the plot. In Appendix B, it contains the
operational plan for the coup which includes detailed instructions on the massive propaganda
campaign to destabilize Mosaddeq’s government. The history was disclosed by James Risen of
the New York Times in its editions of April 16 and June 18, 2000. 70 On the same day as the latter
article, the New York Times posted the documents in their entirety on its Web site. 71
Earlier, in 1999, the National Security Archive had filed a lawsuit against the CIA for the
Wilber and another history of the 1953 coup that were known to exist. CIA refused to release
the documents, except for the phrase “Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and
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despair,” on the grounds that doing so would jeopardize United States national security. 72 The
Wilber history leaves no doubt that the 1953 coup was “planned and executed by the CIA, with
some help from Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) – not in a ‘national uprising’ as some
Iranians claim.” 73 The history is obviously the tip of an iceberg as about an additional 1000
pages of CIA documents about TPAJAX (the official codename for the coup) remain classified,
according to the CIA. This is while the CIA had earlier claimed that all documentation about the
1953 plot was destroyed. 74 Kermit Roosevelt’s account of the coup, 75 a major actor in the
coup, was not used as a primary source because, while it is useful to read, the memoir may be
more self-serving and more withholding compared to Wilber’s history because it was intended
for an external rather than internal audience.
In addition to the above primary sources, the study makes use of secondary material on
the U.S. role in the coup. As the author is a native Farsi speaker, she was able to supplement
English sources with those in Farsi, incorporating the voices of some of the Iranians who
witnessed the events of the 1951 to 1953 period. Evidently, this study is limited to the analysis
of American propaganda in Iran in the above time period and, as such, it does not draw on
sources related to relevant British or Russian propaganda activities in Iran. These projects
remain for future studies to attend to.

Chapter Outline
Following the introduction (chapter I) and the methodology (chapter II), chapter III will
focus on propaganda theory and practice. Chapter III gives an overview of the nuances of
propaganda and a historical summary of United States’ propaganda practices since World War I.
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Chapter IV elaborates on U.S. policy regarding Iran’s nationalization of oil and Iranian public
opinion at the time. Chapter V is an extended chapter entailing the case study of American
propaganda in Iran during the 1951 to 1953 period. Chapter VI is devoted to concluding remarks
about the implications of the 1953 coup.
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CHAPTER III – PROPAGANDA THEORY AND PRACTICE
Defining Propaganda
Propaganda got its name from an institution in the Roman Catholic Church established to
contain the effects of the Protestant revolution. Despite the widespread suggestion that the
“origin [of the word propaganda] stands in sharp contrast to [its] current meaning,” 76 Black
suggests that the original usage of the word directs us to the following general definition: “the
spreading of ideas that would not occur naturally, but only via a cultivated or artificial
generation.” 77 At this stage, propaganda was considered a moral endeavor and did not have the
derogatory connotation it has today. Definitions of propaganda abound, but adopting one over
the other inhibits the understanding of propaganda as a concept that is “grounded on something
more sturdy than mere intuition and popular misconception.” 78 Consequently, it is necessary to
analyze the commonalities among these definitions and examine their distinguishing features.
In a comprehensive review of the definitions of propaganda, Cunningham finds the
following elements common to the many definitions furnished. First, propaganda is an activity
that aims to control opinion through significant symbols (e.g., language, art, film, etc.). 79
Second, the ultimate goal of propaganda is to influence action or behavior. Cunningham concurs
with Ellul in that “what ultimately defines propaganda’s success is the generation of unthinking
behavior by virtue of which the individual conforms himself to the larger group or society.” 80
By circumventing thoughtful action, propaganda inhibits freedom and choice. Another
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important defining element is the centrality of intention and deliberateness in manipulating the
beliefs and actions of others. In other words, for communication to be propagandistic, it has to
be a deliberate attempt at shaping/manipulating others’ behavior by influencing their opinions
and beliefs. A final element common to the majority of definitions of propaganda, according to
Cunningham, is the assumption that propaganda is a neutral activity that can be directed to
achieve good or bad ends. 81
Jowett and O’Donnell provide a useful definition that encompasses most of the above
elements. They contend, “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions,
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent
of the propagandist.” 82 As such, propaganda has an essential relationship with power. It is a
deliberate and systematic method of legitimating and reproducing a certain ideology, or a certain
construction of reality, to further the interests of the propagandizing group. From the mentioned
defining elements of propaganda, it follows that disinformation and lies are not necessary
conditions for propaganda. Propaganda “operates instead with many kinds of truth – half truth,
limited truth, truth out of context.” 83 Although propaganda does not necessitate resorting to lies,
it does not exclude it either.
Nelson’s definition of propaganda gives a more detailed conceptualization of the term:
Propaganda is neutrally defined as a systematic form of PURPOSEFUL PERSUASION
that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target
audiences for ideological, political, or commercial purposes through the controlled
transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and
direct media channels. 84
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Based on Nelson’s definition, propaganda has several characteristics: it is a process
involving organized manipulative mass communication artifacts to influence public opinion for
the promotion of a particular cause. Nelson also suggests that modern propaganda is less about
“changing minds” and more about achieving psychological resonance with the existing
prejudices and attitudes of the targeted publics. 85
The main difference between propaganda and other forms of communication, according
to Jowett and O’Donnell, lies in propaganda’s self-serving purpose. Unlike informative
communication, which has the goal of mutual understanding, and unlike persuasive
communication, which should necessarily fulfill mutual needs (i.e., being mutually beneficial to
all parties), propaganda is a propagandist’s attempt to fulfill his/her interests regardless of the
needs of the receiving party. 86 Jowett and O’Donnell, however, do contend that, to be effective,
propaganda is often disguised as a neutral form of communication. This is done by concealing
the purpose of the propaganda, in which case, the propagandist appears “as a persuader with a
stated purpose that seems to satisfy mutual needs” 87 Moreover, the propagandist sometimes
conceals his/her identity, capitalizing on the credibility of the pseudo-sender of the message, to
avoid public backlash.
In the same light, Lumley conceptualizes propaganda as a form of communication that by
its very nature involves some form of concealment. 88 He thus gives the following definition:
Propaganda is promotion which is veiled in one way or another as to (1) its origin or
sources, (2) the interests involved, (3) the methods employed, (4) the content spread, and
(5) the results accruing to the victims – any one, any two, any three, any four, or all
five. 89
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Categories of Propaganda
Ellul believes effective propaganda must be total in that it should utilize all available
media and use all forms of propaganda. 90 Classifications of propaganda forms that reappear in
the literature include pre-propaganda, black propaganda, white propaganda, gray propaganda,
integration propaganda, agitation propaganda, and propaganda of the deed. 91
Ellul is of the opinion that direct propaganda, which aims to affect opinions and attitudes,
should be preceded by what he calls “pre-propaganda.” 92 Pre-propaganda is of sociological
character, is slow and general, and is conducted with the aim to set the climate for the ultimate
change in opinions and/or behaviors. Jowett and O’Donnell use the terms “sub-propaganda” and
“facilitative communication” to capture the same notion. 93
White propaganda involves a self-serving, selective use of accurate information from an
identifiable source. 94 “Persuaders who have facts or events on their side often rely on a white
propaganda approach utilizing straightforward, honest communication to make their case.” 95
Black propaganda, on the other hand, signifies deceptive messaging or disinformation and is
often accompanied by the concealment of the source of the message. Gray propaganda lies in
between white and black propaganda, in which case the accuracy of the information may be in
question and the source may or may not be correctly identified 96
Jowett and O’Donnell develop the following two models with regard to the source of the
propaganda: the deflective model and the legitimating model. 97 In the deflective model, the
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actual source is unknown because it secretly passes information to an apparent source that would
then pass it on to the target audience. In a legitimating model, the actual source first secretly
transfers the information to a second party and then receives it back and transfers it to the target
audience. In this model, the actual source of the message is obscured. The actual source
pretends to be a mere channel of information flow. This model is used to create credibility for
the message. These two models are related to the two categories of black and gray propaganda.
Ellul doubts that propaganda is merely “a manipulation of symbols, an abstract influence
on opinions.” 98 Rather, he believes propaganda’s existence rests on the formation of institutions
supporting the aims of the propaganda and the realization of propagated ideas and messages in
action. Accordingly, it is the existence of “external propaganda structures” and the concrete
organization of propaganda that give it continuity. 99
Ellul suggests that the main difference between modern propaganda and the practice
during earlier ages lies in their ultimate aim: “The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to
modify ideas, but to provoke action. The aim is no longer to change adherence to a doctrine, but
to make the individual cling irrationally to a process of action.” 100 This distinction is important
since it undermines the pervasive definition of propaganda as the manipulation of symbols for
changing ideas or opinions. Ellul further indicates that when gauging the effectiveness of
propaganda, the only indicator of success is action. The change in attitudes and beliefs is not
indicative of success. He also suggests that “to be effective propaganda must constantly shortcircuit thought and decision,” so that individuals are channeled to take particular courses of
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action in political and social affairs without taking into consideration all their convictions and
beliefs. 101
The ultimate behavior sought could be integrative or agitative. Integration propaganda
aims to direct individuals toward behaviors that “unify, integrate, and harmonize a society.” 102
Integration propaganda, therefore, renders the public into passive acceptance of societal norms.
Agitation propaganda, on the other hand, is a kind of propaganda that aims to incite the public to
change. It “is designed and orchestrated to arouse the public, to generate turmoil, to incite fear
and discontent, to destabilize, and to promote the repudiation of existing structures and social
conditions.” 103
An additional category of propaganda is propaganda of the deed. Osgood defines this
category of propaganda as “actions taken for the psychological effects they have on different
publics.” 104 The most outright example of this kind of propaganda is the use of terrorist/violent
activities, such as bombings and assassinations. 105 Osgood contends that other non-violent
activities such as “educational and cultural exchanges, economic aid, disaster relief, disarmament
initiatives, international agreements, the appointment of investigating commissions, legislation”
and the like when “employed primarily for the effects they would have on public opinion” are
also examples of propaganda of the deed. 106
Osgood classifies cultural propaganda as a sub-category of propaganda of the deed. 107
“Cultural propaganda is a long-term process intended to promote a better understanding of the
nation that is sponsoring the activity” and includes the dissemination of cultural artifacts such as
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films, magazines, radio and television programs, art exhibitions, etc.108 This propaganda activity
also entails the promotion of language teaching and other educational programs such as studentexchange programs.

Propaganda and American Foreign Policy
The Origins of Official U.S. Propaganda
The United States has used propaganda as an instrumental tool of foreign policy,
especially during times of crises, war, and conflict. 109 World War I, as the first total war, is
considered the “launching pad” of modern propaganda. 110 A week after the United States
entered the war in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the establishment of the Committee
on Public Information (CPI, otherwise known as the Creel Committee) to mobilize domestic
support for the war as well as execute foreign propaganda. A life-long journalist himself,
George Creel, the committee’s director, encouraged journalists to practice “self-censorship”
when covering the war. The committee also encouraged the public to report to the authorities
individuals who were opposed to the war or displayed disloyalty. Consequently, the committee
grew unpopular among the media and Wilson’s rival politicians. As a result, Congress quickly
abolished the organization in 1919 after the war ended, leaving the United States without an
organized propaganda apparatus for the next two decades. 111
During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt again established an official
propaganda organization mainly to combat German propaganda. Nelson A. Rockefeller became
the first director of the newly found Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA),
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which was a bureau inside the State Department. As director of CIAA, Rockefeller established
many of the propaganda programs that became the basis for later U.S. propaganda in the Cold
War and beyond. These included the Voice of America (VOA) and the Office of War
Information (OWI), both formed in 1942. The U.S. government created, through the OWI, a
worldwide network of information posts for the promotion of its interests abroad. These
permanent information posts became the backbone of the United States Information Agency,
which was later established as the American Cold War propaganda infrastructure. Like the Creel
Committee, OWI was responsible for both domestic and foreign propaganda. 112

American Cold War Propaganda
Although the United States used propaganda extensively during the two world wars, it
“institutionalized” its use of propaganda during the Cold War, elevating it to “a central
component of American foreign policy.” 113 According to Parry-Guiles, “Truman and
Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official
peacetime institution. In a ‘war of words,’ propaganda acted as an integral component of the
government’s foreign policy operation.” 114 The first decade of the Cold War constituted the
tensest period of ideological struggle. 115 In this period, U.S. foreign policy was one of
containment and aimed to isolate communism and prevent its expansion. As a result, the United
States worked to secure a buffer of client states around the Soviet Union. 116 Given its strategic
importance and its long borders with the Soviet Union, Iran was in essence a strategic ideological
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battleground during the Cold War. 117 More generally, the Middle East, with its vast petroleum
resources, was perceived as the winning card of the battle between the Western world and the
Soviet Union. 118
As the Cold War solidified and anti-communism became the dominant framework of
U.S. foreign policy, the tide of misgivings about the usefulness and necessity of propaganda in
peacetime subsided. In the fall of 1947, a congressional fact-finding mission led by Senator H.
Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R-North Dakota) assessed the
ideological state of European and Middle Eastern countries and concluded that the Soviets were
winning the war of ideas. As a result, in January of 1948, Congress passed the U.S. Information
and Educational Exchange Act, which became known as the Smith-Mundt Act. 119 The new law
legitimized United States propaganda activities and gave the State Department jurisdiction over
international propaganda programs as well as cultural and exchange programs. Given the
widespread discontent with the government’s use of domestic propaganda during the two world
wars, the Smith-Mundt Act forbade it from propagandizing inside the United States. 120
In the 1950s, Truman initiated a propaganda program called the Campaign for Truth.
Under this initiative, the budget for U.S. propaganda activities “jumped from $20 million in 1948
to $115 million in 1952.” 121 In 1953, President Eisenhower established the United States
Information Agency (USIA). While this was a little less than a decade into the Cold War, the
USIA was the first official propaganda agency created during peacetime. Existing propaganda
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efforts, such as Voice of America, moved under the USIA’s jurisdiction. In conjunction with the
USIA, the newly created Central Intelligence Agency, agencies responsible for providing foreign
aid, and the armed forces also conducted propaganda activities. The CIA, in particular, carried
out covert psychological operations in allied and neutral countries. “It conducted numerous
operations to influence political developments around the world, most notably in Italy, the
Philippines, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Cuba, Vietnam, Thailand, Chile, Iraq, and Angola.” 122
The present case study of early Cold War U.S. propaganda activities in Iran is significant for it
captures a juncture of time when for the first time American propaganda apparatus was used to
topple an elected foreign government.
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CHAPTER IV – THE CONTEXT, IDEOLOGY, AND PURPOSE OF THE
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
This chapter addresses two of the 10 stages in Jowett and O’Donnell’s propaganda
model. It aims to identify the ideology and purpose of U.S. propaganda in Iran in the 1951-1953
years while elaborating on the period’s socio-political context. The chapter provides an
overview of the events that ensued between the decision of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) to
nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in March 1951 and the CIA orchestrated coup that
overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mosaddeq in August 1953. The focus of the
present section is on U.S. policy toward the nationalization crisis and the state of Iranian public
opinion. This information will elucidate on the goals and objectives of U.S. propaganda in the
time period under study.

Iranian Public Opinion
Iran’s decision to nationalize AIOC assets did not arise out of a vacuum. The decision
was as much about uprooting British interference in Iran’s internal affairs as it was about Iran’s
negligible share of the benefits of its natural resources. A 1952 article by an Iranian professor at
Princeton University well captures Iranian sentiment in this regard: “The Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company from the very outset, with the aid of British Government officials stationed in Iran,
established itself as an independent state within the state of Iran.” 123 Fatemi describes the
nationalization movement as a “revolution” against “British oppression” that is by no means
communist in character.124 “It is a revolution against Red imperialism as well as against British
Black imperialism,” he says. 125 The Majlis, according to Fatemi, is simply acting in the national
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interest of Iran. The movement is, in essence, “anti-colonial and pro-Iran.” 126 In the words of
Fatemi, this is what the Iranian people say:
We have toiled, sweated, and suffered in order that people in England should have a
happy and gay life. Our misery and poverty – they are inconceivable; they could not be
worse; our patience is exhausted and we can endure no more. We are prepared to cooperate with the West on the basis of equality and partnership, but the British slogan,
‘Just wait until the beggars need the money; that will bring them to their knees’ is no
longer true. We would rather die than accept British or Russian or any other domination
over our fatherland. 127
A study prepared for the National Security Council (NSC) in March of 1951 gave the
following appraisal of the Iranian public opinion environment: “the belief is widespread in Iran
that the company is unfairly exploiting the country by refusing to offer reasonable and equitable
royalties and its entire operation is resented as a closed corporation exploiting Iranian wealth but
beyond the reach of Iranian custom or law.” 128 This situation, according to the NSC study,
resulted in “strong antagonism against the British, and, among the less educated, against all
foreigners.” 129 Many Iranians at the time believed that “the Western powers are not seriously
interested in the welfare and independence of the country but are concerned only with exploiting
its primary resources for their own purposes.” 130 Given this widespread attitude, the study
recommended that a successful U.S. policy requires, among other things, “a substantially
enlarged program of information and cultural relations in Iran.” 131
American officials on the ground acknowledged widespread support among the Iranian
elite and general public for nationalization and putting an end to British political interference as

126

Ibid.: 57.
Ibid.
128
"Study Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council (No. 6)," 14.
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid., 13.
127

32

exemplified by the excesses of the oil company. 132 In his visit to Iran, Averell Harriman, the
special assistant to President Truman, for example, noted, “There is complete unanimity of
opinion among qualified American officials that Mosaddeq is strongly supported by very large
majority of Iranian people, and no Iranian program has ever been backed to the extent of his
program to eliminate Brit influence in Iran and nationalize the oil industry.” 133 He urged
Washington to take into account the very strong public emotion regarding nationalization noting,
“In opinion of all Americans here and responsible Iranians with whom I have talked, any Iranian
Government, whether it be that of Mosaddeq or someone else, cannot run counter to this
emotion.” 134 In other words, Iranian officials felt very much constrained, due to this
overwhelming public demand for nationalization, against giving in to any British concession that
could bring back the status quo. In his conversations with American officials, Mosaddeq often
rhetorically asked, “what would the Iranian people say?”
The above-mentioned Iranian attitude of equating the exploitative policies of the Soviets
with those of the Western powers would have been utterly destructive to the cause of anticommunism and run counter to the ultimate aim of using Iran as a buffer against Soviet
expansionism. To mitigate this counter-productive mentality, a National Security Council
directive, NSC 107/2, found it necessary for the United States to “strengthen the ability and
desire of the Iranian people to resist communist subversion and pressure.” 135 Such a measure
was determined to be a necessary prerequisite for ensuring “a government in power in Iran on the
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side of the free world, capable of maintaining internal order and determined to resist Soviet
aggression.” 136 NSC 107/2 expressed the need for the United States “to extend political support,
primarily to the Shah as the only present source of continuity of leadership” in this regard. 137
Given this policy, instilling an anti-communist sentiment in the Iranian public served as the
overarching objective of U.S. propaganda in this time period.
Throughout the nationalization crisis, the internal communication of the State
Department showed little sympathy with the Iranian public for their grievances against the AIOC
that had led to their nationalist outburst. The situation is framed, for instance, as a result of “the
highly emotional atmosphere surrounding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dispute, which
fanatical nationalist elements in Iran have used to stir up popular feeling.” 138 Iranians’ inflexible
support for nationalization is said to be “highly irrational and emotional … even when the
economic stakes are high,” to use the words of George McGhee, the assistant secretary of state
for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs. 139 Henry Grady, U.S. ambassador in Iran
from 1950 to 1951, described Iranian nationalism in similar terms: “The fanaticism is a reflection
of the ‘independence’ complex which I have seen in a number of countries.” He goes on to say,
“This is not by any means all bad as it also affects their attitude toward Russia.” 140
Initially, Iranian sentiment toward the United States was generally positive, 141 but it
deteriorated as U.S. support for the British policy became more apparent. By the time of the
coup, Iranian public opinion had turned anti-American. In the words of Secretary of State John
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Foster Dulles, “Our unpopularity in Iran is largely a derivation of British unpopularity and our
previous association in the minds of Iranians with unpopular British policies.” 142

United States: From Quiet Support of British Policy to Covert Action
The primary objective of the United States in Iran was “to prevent the domination of that
country by the USSR and to strengthen Iran’s association with the free world.” 143 Iran’s attempt
to nationalize its oil industry was believed to jeopardize both the independence of Iran from
Soviet influence and “the free flow of Iranian oil into the economy of the free world,” President
Truman wrote to Prime Minister Attlee of Britain. 144 Evidently, from the beginning of the crisis,
the United States did not favor Iran’s nationalization because it gave the Soviet Union the chance
to exert influence in the distribution of Iran’s oil. In response to President Truman’s letter,
Attlee, on June 5, 1951, expressed doubt that Iran was willing to consider the interests of Great
Britain since it was fixated on negotiating in terms of “the implementation of the Persian
nationalization laws.” 145 This, Attlee said, involves a unilateral cancellation of the company’s
1933 concession-agreement, which could set in motion similar breaches of contracts elsewhere,
greatly endangering the interests of Western powers worldwide.
To prevent such a disastrous outcome, the United States struggled in the ensuing two
years to persuade the Iranians to reach an agreement with the British. U.S. policy was to protect
the interests of the West in Iran first through “quiet support” for the British position, then
through active intermediation, and finally through covert action to bring down the government of
Mosaddeq. The preparation and planning for the covert CIA operation got under way during the
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Truman administration. The coup was eventually operationalized and implemented by the
Eisenhower administration.
In a telegram on March 17, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson wrote to the American
embassy in Iran that “while in general U.S. does not favor nationalization, U.S. recognizes [the]
right of sovereign states to nationalize provided prompt payment [for] just compensation
made.” 146 Acheson, however, noted that the United States did not wish to publicize this policy
as it would have encouraged other nations to nationalize their oil industries as well. Acheson’s
letter signaled the beginning of a period of “quiet support” for the British stance. 147 By avoiding
outright opposition to nationalization, the Truman administration aimed to avoid alienating Iran
from the Western camp. Knowing that most Iranians were in favor of nationalizing their oil
industry, the Truman administration believed that any British offer should at least accept
nationalization in principle as a “face-saving device for substantial segment in Iran which has
gone on record as demanding nationalization.” 148 The United States proposed that the British
superficially alter their settlement offer to add “more of a ‘flavor’ of nationalization in some
form that would have minimum effect upon the actual control of the company’s operations.” 149
Iran had turned down previous AIOC offers that even lacked this “flavor” and had
demanded complete control over the management and sale of oil. The Department of State
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found this stance “reckless” and “completely unreasonable” and instructed Ambassador Grady to
personally request the Shah “to use his personal influence to have this position modified.” 150
Britain had thus succeeded in persuading the United States that its apparent neutrality
was hurting the prospect of any settlement since Iranians viewed American policy in opposition
to that of the British and hoped to exploit that difference to their advantage. In a letter to Prime
Minister Mosaddeq on July 8, 1951, President Truman urged Mosaddeq to find ways to
“reconcile the principle of nationalization and British interests to the benefit of both” since Iran
needed British skill and operating knowledge to run its oil industry. 151 Upon reception of the
letter, Mosaddeq expressed great disappointment at the U.S. position, saying to Ambassador
Grady, “The message takes the British side entirely. The Americans have always taken the
British side in this oil dispute and have never given aid to Iran.” 152 Mosaddeq was referring to a
$25 million loan from the U.S. Export/Import Bank that the Americans had promised was
forthcoming. The loan never materialized despite Iran’s grave economic difficulties that were
intensified with a later boycott of Iranian oil.
On July 9, Truman offered to send Averell Harriman as United States special
representative to act as a mediator between the British and Iranians to arrive at a solution.
Harriman arrived in Tehran on July 15 while an angry group of demonstrators shouting antiAmerican slogans gathered in front of the airport. A violent clash ensued between the police and
troops and left at least 15 people dead and 200 injured. The forceful quelling of demonstrations
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happened under the command of General Zahedi, the interior minister at the time, who in two
years replaced Mosaddeq following the CIA coup. Zahedi subsequently resigned. 153
During his stay, Harriman tried to convince the Iranians to accept British control of their
oil industry on the condition that the British accede to nationalization in principle. The Iranian
interpretation of the principle of nationalization, however, proved much different from that of the
British and Americans. The Iranians aimed to bring the “discovery, extraction, [and]
exploitation of oil” under the control of Iran’s government, something the British were not
willing to give up. 154 The “British proposal was in fact for a concession in disguise,” Mosaddeq
told Harriman; it called for something he “could never sell to the Iranian people.” 155
While trying to convince the Iranians to the contrary, Harriman reported his honest
opinion regarding the British proposal to the Department of State as follows: “In my opinion
arrangements under British proposal can be worked out to result in either camouflage for
complete return of British control or adequate recognition of NIOC’s right to appropriate control,
safeguarding against practices which Iranians objected to in past.” 156 On August 25, 1951,
Harriman left Tehran without success in bringing Iran and Britain any closer to a negotiated
settlement of the dispute. In an earlier telegram, he expressed frustration that “there was little if
any chance to come to a workable arrangement with” Mosaddeq. 157
Mosadeq (sic) expects foreign staff to work on his terms, foreign oil companies to buy
and distribute oil on his terms, and Iran to get all of the profits with compensation only to
owners for property taken over. In his dream world the simple passage of legislation
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nationalizing oil industry creates profitable business and everyone is expected to help
Iran on terms that he lays down. 158
Harriman’s attitude and position shows that by this time, American policy was much in
line with that of the British. Ambassador Grady warned the State Department that this policy
could “lead to disaster.” Upon Harriman’s departure, Grady wrote the following:
We have reached the point now where we must decide to maintain our own policy or
accept that of British. It is my strong conviction that British policy has been and is one
that may well lead to disaster in this country. They are using economic sanctions to get
Mosaddeq out and want us to do the same … The British definitely want us to join with
them in economic sanctions. If we decide to let them call all the plays, we will absorb a
large part of present deep antagonism toward British. 159
Grady urged Secretary Acheson to realize that the main goal in Iran was to keep the
country in the Western camp not to push the British policy. “To do this at least one of the great
western democracies must maintain a position of basic friendliness for Iran,” he said.
“Otherwise, it will have no place to look for friendship and assistance except to Russia.” 160
Grady resigned from his post and left Iran on September 19, 1951. He was replaced with Loy
Henderson, who was approved by the Senate on September 13 and arrived at Tehran on
September 22. In a speech in 1952, Grady asserted that the British policy in Iran was based on
“the colonial approach – financial and economic pressures to prevent control from slipping
away.” 161 Grady continued, “And as time went on, particularly at the time I left, we seemed to
be underwriting this policy,” a policy that amounts to “doing things exactly the wrong way.” 162
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Faced with Iran’s resistance to return the control of its oil industry to Britain, American
and British officials intensified a parallel track of talks with the Shah regarding ways to remove
Mosaddeq from the scene. The Shah, however, felt he could do little in face of Iranian public
opinion. The issue of Mosaddeq’s replacement was discussed even as negotiations transpired.
On June 26, 1951, Walter Gifford, U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, informed the State
Department that British Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison had expressed the view that “Shah
should dismiss Mossadeq (sic) and dissolve Majlis, but felt that Shah has not courage to do
so.” 163
On July 1, 1951, Ambassador Grady wrote to the State Department, “The British, led by
Mr. Morrison, seem to be determined to follow the old tactics of getting the government out with
which it has difficulties… Mosadeq (sic) has the backing of 95 to 98 percent of the people of this
country. It is utter folly to try to push him out.” 164 Secretary Acheson disagreed with Grady and
expressed the view that if Iran’s pursuit of “ultra-nationalism” endangered its security, the State
“Department perceives possibility that extraordinary political measures might be required in
effort [to] prevent loss of Iran to the free world.” 165 A few months later, following a
conversation with the Shah, Harriman noted that the Shah said, “It would be difficult or
impossible to replace the Mosaddeq Government unless there is a complete change of attitude in
the country towards him and his program.” 166
Upon the breakdown of the Harriman negotiations, Ambassador Henderson was
instructed by Secretary Acheson to tell the Shah in his first meeting that “while decision as to
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whether Mosaddeq should be replaced at this time is entirely up to Shah to make, he should be
strongly encouraged if he feels he is in position to bring this about.” 167 Britain had a similar
message for the Shah. “The Shah should be informed that the British might make more
acceptable proposals if they could deal with a more reasonable Iranian Government,” the British
cabinet decided on September 27, 1951. 168
On September 5, 1951, AIOC issued a notice warning that it would take action against
any company opting to purchase Iranian oil. The boycott was coupled with British sanctions and
the United States’ refusal to give Iran aid, including the $25 million loan it had offered before.
The aim was to bring Mosaddeq’s government to its knees, but more importantly to cause public
resentment of Mosaddeq’s inability to settle the oil issue. In the words of Secretary Acheson,
“Failure of Mosadeq (sic) government to do anything for its country either by settling oil
controversy or obtaining foreign loans might tend to bring about a more reasonable attitude and
possibly a change in politics if not of government.” 169 These actions were expected to have the
most effect if they were seen as a result of Mosaddeq’s inept policies.
Mosaddeq had underestimated how much U.S. policy was congruent with that of the
British. He had wrongly believed that, because of its Cold War objectives, the United States
would come to its rescue by purchasing Iranian oil and offering technical assistance. However,
the United States was not even ready to offer a loan to Iran because, in the words of Acheson,
“proceeding with loan would unduly strain U.S.-U.K. relations.” 170 As of January 1952, the net
amount of economic aid the United States had offered Iran since the inception of the crisis was
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less than two million dollars, according to Ambassador Grady. Grady compares this to his two
years in Greece, when U.S. aid amounted to over a million dollars a day. 171
On October 4, 1951, Mosaddeq expelled all British employees from the Abadan refinery.
The expulsion of the British employees was seen as a “blow to Brit and … to Western influence
and prestige in area,” in Acheson’s words. 172 Britain took its case to the United Nations Security
Council. Mosaddeq traveled to New York in mid-October to defend Iran’s position. He found
this trip an opportunity not only to defend Iran’s case before an international body but also to
have direct talks with President Truman and Secretary Acheson.
Mosaddeq spoke to the U.N. Security Council on October 14 and 16, arguing that it was
Britain that had put international peace in danger and not Iran. In his defense, Mosaddeq showed
documents obtained from the residence of Sodon, the AIOC representative in Iran, illustrating
that Britain had acquired the 1933 oil contract for the continuation of the D’Arcy concession
through threats and pressures on Iranian officials. The 1933 concession agreement was thus an
illegal contract. He further argued that Iran, like any other country, has the right to decide which
foreign company operates in its territory and that this is a matter of internal politics and out of
the jurisdiction of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, which had earlier
ruled against the unilateral breach of contracts. 173
The U.N. Security Council resolution failed to pass and the case was sent back to the
International Court of Justice to decide about its own authority on the matter. 174 In June 1952,
Mosaddeq headed a delegation to defend Iran’s case before the International Court of Justice.
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The court ruled in Iran’s favor, which meant that the dispute had to be settled under Iranian
law. 175
Upon the conclusion of the U.N. sessions, Mosaddeq and the Iranian delegation headed to
Washington, where they stayed for 47 days in hopes of arriving at a negotiated solution to the oil
crisis. While in Washington, Mosaddeq met with President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and
Assistant Secretary McGhee. In these meetings, State Department officials “endeavored to
obtain from him maximum concessions” which would restart negotiations in a way acceptable to
the British. 176 The British, however, were hoping for Mosaddeq’s downfall and the emergence
of “a more amenable government.” 177 Later, Iran turned down a U.S.-backed February 1952
proposal that entailed the vesting of the control and management of Iran’s oil industry in the
authority of the World Bank and that required the rehiring of ex-AIOC employees. 178
Meanwhile, U.S. representatives, most notably Ambassador Loy Henderson, were keen
to tell Mosaddeq and the Shah that the nationalization of Iran’s oil resources had been
destructive to the political and economic wellbeing of the country. The main theme in these
conversations was that Iran did not have the capacity to run the oil industry and would thus bring
about its own destruction while alienating the country from the free world. In a conversation
with the Shah on December 22, 1951, for example, Henderson said, “AIOC had been driven out
and Brit influence in Iran had been greatly reduced. Practically nothing had been done, however,
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to heal gaping political and economic wounds which Iran had suffered in gaining control of its
own oil.” 179
In a conversation with the Shah on June 13, 1952, Ambassador Henderson reassured the
Shah that the United States was not supporting Mosaddeq and did not approve of his actions. He
impressed on the Shah that it was time to take action, saying the following:
If Shah allowed Iran to continue drift towards ruin without taking some action himself or
indicating to statesmen looking to him so anxiously for guidance that he would not object
to their taking action, confidence in Throne might ebb to such extent it would be more
difficult to rally people round it later in last minute effort to save country.180
On July 16, 1952, the Shah attempted for the first time to intervene. Mosaddeq asked for
increased powers to deal with the political and economic crisis, including the selection of the
War Minister (which was hitherto appointed by the Shah, although contrary to the Iranian
constitution). Upon Shah’s refusal, Mosaddeq resigned. Shah asked for the Majlis to appoint a
new premier. The Majlis voted for the veteran politician Ahmad Qavam, but only in the absence
of 28 pro-Mosaddeq deputies.
Mosaddeq supporters “called for protest strikes and mass demonstrations in favor of his
reinstatement. Most notably, Ayatollah Kashani condemned Qavam as “the enemy of religion,
freedom, and national independence,” as quoted by Abrahamian, and called on the people to
come to the streets. 181 In the subsequent four days, huge crowds demonstrated asking for the
return of Mosaddeq. The Shah who was afraid for his crown agreed with Qavam’s resignation
and reappointed Mosaddeq as prime minister with the powers he had requested. 182 This day
came to be known as the 30th Teer (July 21st) uprising. In a matter of six months, however, when
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Mosaddeq asked Majlis to extend his emergency powers, including the permission “to decree
any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial,
and educational reforms,” the cohesion among nationalization allies dwindled. 183
On August 7, 1952, Mosaddeq sent a diplomatic note to the British embassy in Tehran
demanding that the AIOC pay all the funds due to Iran that the company was withholding, that
Britain unfreeze all Iranian assets in U.K. banks, and that AIOC cease its measures to boycott the
sale of Iranian oil. With these measures in place, Mosaddeq wrote, Iran would be ready to enter
into negotiations with representatives of the AIOC to settle the company’s claims. 184 Doubtful
of British agreement, Mosaddeq told Ambassador Henderson that “Britishers who advocated
leisurely approach really hoped, and were working, for some kind of coup d’état” and that he
would sever relations with Britain if they did not respond constructively to his note by August
27. 185
The United States decided to take a coordinated approach with the United Kingdom,
sending a joint reply from President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill (who had succeeded
Attlee in late 1951) on August 27. The message proposed that the question of compensation to
AIOC be taken to the International Court of Justice. The United States also pledged to give Iran
an immediate grant of $10 million. 186 Mosaddeq refused the proposal on the grounds that it
would change the nature of the dispute from one between Iran and a foreign company to a
dispute between Iran, Britain, and the United States. The international repercussions outweighed
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the forthcoming gift. 187 On October 22, 1952, Mosaddeq severed diplomatic relations with
Britain.
By this time, it was clear that the chances of a negotiated settlement of the crisis on terms
agreeable to the United States and Britain were slim. The Truman administration was convinced
that the only chance was Mosaddeq’s removal. The United States hoped for a non-military
measure to solve the Iran crisis, but, as of November 1952, the Defense Department was working
on possible military courses of action against likely Soviet intrusions. 188 While NSC 136 and
136/1 “estimated that communist forces will probably not gain control of the Iranian government
during 1953,” 189 in Paragraph 5, it called for plans for “specific military, economic, diplomatic,
and psychological measures which should be taken to support a non-communist Iranian
Government or to prevent all or part of Iran or adjacent areas from falling under communist
domination.” 190 Francis Gavin, an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs,
believes that this shift in policy occurred also due to the significant improvements made in U.S.
military capabilities, making it feasible for the Truman administration to attempt more risky
ventures. 191
According to a progress report for the NSC, as quoted by Gavin, the “CIA’s detailed plan
for covert operations in Iran during 1953 was approved by the PSB [Psychological Strategy
Board] on January 8, 1953,” just 12 days before Eisenhower’s inauguration. 192 The issue of an
Anglo-American covert action was first formally discussed, according to a CIA account of the
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coup, in Washington between November and December of 1952 when British and U.S.
representatives were discussing the issue of joint war against a possible Soviet attack. 193
The use of CIA covert psychological operations had been authorized in 1947, when the
newly established National Security Council issued a directive titled “Coordination of Foreign
Information Measures.” 194 The directive determined that “in the interests of world peace and
U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be
supplemented by covert psychological operations.” 195 As part of the directive, NSC-4A detailed
the responsibilities of the CIA in this regard:
The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence
activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the
Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence, under
authority of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National
Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct,
within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to
counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace
and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to
promote world peace and security. 196
After the Shah’s unsuccessful attempt to replace Mosaddeq with Qavam, Ambassador
Henderson had repeated correspondence with the State Department about the possibility of a
coup against Mosaddeq. 197 As an example, Henderson reported on March 6, 1953, that the
“possibility and advisability of attempting military coup d’état continues [to] be surreptitiously
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discussed.” 198 U.S. policy was now strongly in line with that of Britain, working to bring about
the overthrow of Mosaddeq.

Conclusion
This section has shown that the primary objectives of U.S. policy in Iran were to maintain
Anglo-American control of the country’s oil resources and to curb Soviet power in the region.
American officials realized that nationalism was a real and potent force in the country and that
Mosaddeq enjoyed overwhelming public support. Given the frustration of negotiations,
removing Mosaddeq from power was an option from the start. As Grady notes in a speech in
1952, “There would be no great concern about the upsurging of nationalism in the Middle East
were it not for the hazards inherent in its geographic position and its great resources in oil.” 199
The Truman administration was only willing to support a veneer of nationalization, one that did
not entrust the Iranians with the management and control of their oil industry.
Faced with Iranian resistance, the Truman administration adopted a parallel channel of
talks while covertly planning to weaken and eventually bring down the government of
Mosaddeq. This aim was fulfilled through the CIA coup implemented under the Eisenhower
administration. To achieve a successful Iran policy, it naturally follows that U.S. propaganda
would have aimed to propagate an anti-communist ideology and would have attempted to reduce
Mosaddeq’s popularity and legitimacy by, among other things, alleging that his actions were in
line with the Tudeh Party (the Iranian communist party). The following chapter gives an account
of the propaganda campaign in support of U.S. Iran policy during this critical period.
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CHAPTER V – U.S. PROPAGANDA IN IRAN: 1951-1953
The Pre-Coup Years
As the previous chapter showed, the main objective of the United States in Iran was for
Iran to align itself with the dominant Western countries. For this to happen, United States
government officials found it necessary to create the desire and strength in the Iranian public to
resist communism and to convince them of the benefits of siding with the West. In the period
preceding the CIA coup, the United States Information Service (USIS) in Iran had two distinct
propaganda programs to achieve the mentioned objective: a long range program targeting the
rural population and a short range program targeting the ruling class, opinion leaders, labor
leaders, intellectuals, and students. While the former program aimed to achieve some degree of
economic and political stability in the long term, the latter aimed to directly foster an anticommunist attitude in the short term.
In conjunction with U.S.-sponsored development programs in Iran, the United States
carried out a wide range of educational programs for rural populations with the long term goal of
improving living conditions to avoid a communist outbreak similar to China. These programs
did not directly attack communism. The decision to avoid a direct anti-communist campaign in
the rural areas stemmed in part from the realization that anti-Soviet propaganda would not be
very effective given the extreme misery and poverty of these populations:
The lot of the large proportion of the rural population is a miserable one and the people
feel that their condition could not be any worse under any government. Therefore, they
are not at all impressed or even interested in out and out anti-Soviet propaganda. 200
In addition, the rural population is said to have “a deep and abiding hatred and distrust of
the ruling class which leads them to the belief that our economic and military aid programs are
200
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designed to further strengthen the ruling class whom they regard as their oppressors.” 201 This
state of public opinion is seen as an impediment to direct U.S. propaganda in the rural region.
To mitigate this feeling, United States propaganda programs in rural regions concentrated on
agricultural and public health educational programs and made them appear as programs of the
Iranian government that were, nonetheless, supported by the United States.
The United States planned the program in collaboration with the Iranian government and
supplied all the material, equipment, and personnel. It then branded U.S. activities as those of
the Iranian government by having “various equipment such as mobile units, posters, photo
displays, etc. bear the name and insignia of the Imperial Government of Iran.” 202 The media
used for the long term program were mainly visual, such as films, film-strips, posters, photo
displays and exhibits. These programs were supplemented by radio, press, educational books,
and brochures. 203 The data under study did not give specific description of the content of the
above media.
Given the political reality on the ground, U.S. long-term propaganda, in effect, employed
a deflective model, whereby it used the Iranian government as the channel for the dissemination
of its propaganda material. The propaganda program targeting the rural areas, in effect, aimed to
achieve several objectives at once: increase the prestige of the United States, decrease the
hostility toward the Iranian government, and bring about some degree of political and economic
stability in the long run. With the intensification of the oil crisis and the United States’ refusal to
offer economic aid to Iran, such programs became less relevant.
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In its short term propaganda program, the United States employed all available media,
including radio, press, films, publications, library, and exchange programs, to influence the
attitudes of influential sectors of the Tehran public. These targeted populations, which were
deemed significant because they “actually control[ed] the destiny of the country,” included the
Shah’s Court, members of the government, intellectuals, and wealthy landowners. 204 Thus, in
its direct efforts to orient Iran towards the United States and the so-called free world and to
increase U.S. prestige, U.S. propaganda aimed to influence Iran’s ruling class and influential
opinion leaders. All available media were employed to give “the widest possible coverage to our
[i.e., U.S.] side of world developments.” 205
Although, as part of this program, large doses of anti-communist material were
administered to this audience, a U.S. embassy cable to the Department of State “strongly
emphasized that this can only be done on an ideological basis and that no direct reference can be
made to the Soviet Union, its satellites, or Soviet personalities.” 206 This restriction was in
response to a September 1949 Imperial Iranian Decree that restricted foreign governments from
disseminating material that “make Iran a center and place of political propaganda against a third
government.” 207 In effect, Iran had declared neutrality in the Cold War. Therefore, initially,
anti-communist material emphasized the fallacies and shortcomings of communism rather than a
direct attack on the Soviet Union and its leaders. Despite this reservation, a summary report
from the U.S. embassy in Tehran in May 1953 shows that, at least in 1953, the USIS Tehran
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station did at times directly propagandize against the Soviet Union and other communist
countries.
Among the media used to influence Iranian elites were anti-communist books, leaflets,
brochures, and films. In this, embassy libraries and reading rooms were an important means of
distributing anti-communist and pro-Western material. The USIS library was the only free
public library in Iran. 208 To more prominently display anti-communist books, the embassy
placed “a special shelf in a prominent position in the Library” labeled “IN VIEW OF
INQUIRIES RECEIVED, THIS SHELF IS RESERVED FOR PUBLICATIONS EXPOSING
THE AGGRESSIVE OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNISM AND THE METHODS EMPLOYED
BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND BY ITS AGENT IN VARIOUS
COUNTRIES.” 209
The anti-communist publications exclusively published for use in Iran included the
following:







Commissar! Commissar! – an “8-page cartoon leaflet” rebutting Soviet “germ
warfare propaganda” against the United States,
Tale of the Beautiful Red Flower – an indirect attack on the Soviet Union in a
4-page leaflet telling the story of a red flower that symbolized Soviet
communism “in which lazy and frivolous bees are lured to destruction,”
From Whom Help Is Coming for Me? – a 4-page brochure making a
comparison between the rhetoric of the Soviet Union and the generous deeds
of the “free world” demonstrated by its multitude of international aid,
Which Way to Prosperity and Peace – a 4-page brochure telling the story of
two Iranian boys, one who chooses communism and dies in a demonstration
and the other who chooses the “hard, sure way” of studying and serves his
country,
Voices of God – a 4-page brochure containing quotes from the Quran, the
Iranian poet Hafez, Jesus Christ, and influential figures such as Abraham
Lincoln and Mahatma Gandhi, and
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Plan for Disarmament – an 8-page brochure explaining the U.N. plan for
international disarmament. 210

In addition to the above publications, the U.S. embassy in Tehran placed “260 articles,
features, editorials, and commentaries” in various Tehran and provincial newspapers on anticommunist subjects during the 1951-1953 period. 211 Although the names of the newspapers are
not available, a May 1953 embassy report on U.S. propaganda activities mentions the following
articles:







“Iran on the Brink of a Precipice” – series of articles on the dangers of
communism for Iran,
“Road to Salvation,”
“Social Relations from Beginning of Man to the Present” – an article
comparing social relations in the “free world” and communist countries,
“The Pleasant Scent of Love” – an article on the false attractions of
communism,
“Capitalism, Democracy, Socialism, Communism” – series of articles
explicating the mentioned various ideologies, and
“Contrast between American and Russian Methods in International
Affairs.” 212

Of the films distributed, Azerbaijan Day dealt with the “Iranian communist problem” and
concentrated on Russian occupation of the Iranian Azerbaijan province following World War II.
Four films, the first three in English and the last in Farsi, focused on the justifications for the
Korean War. These comprised One Year in Korea, Why Korea, In Defense of Peace-Times, and
U.S. Aids Republic of Korea. Films of three foreign policy speeches of President Truman and
one of President Eisenhower, dubbed into Farsi, were shown. Five films concentrated on the
theme that anti-communism is an international cause, evidenced by the participation of countries
other than the United States in the Korean War. These included films on Turkish, Greek,
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Philippine, and Thailand troops in Korea. Other films tackled life under European, Chinese, and
Burmese communism. 213
According to Ambassador Henderson, the USIS film program operated with
collaboration with the Iranian government and constituted the largest such program in Iran. 214
To ensure that the Iranian government did not use any American film with a pro-Soviet slant,
even those made during World War II, the U.S. embassy in Iran asked the State Department to
approach U.S. film distributors and request that prints of films with positive portrayal of the
Soviet Union be withdrawn from “critical areas” such as Iran. “To display publicly an
American-made film which praises the Soviet Union can do considerable harm at this time,” said
Edward C. Wells, U.S. public affairs officer in Iran. 215
In early 1952, a revised country plan for U.S. propaganda in Iran indicated the following
target groups comprised the main audience for United States’ direct anti-communist propaganda:
1. “The Shah, Royal Court, and wealthy landowners;
2. “University professors and students, secondary school teachers and students,
professional men, including government employees;
3. “Leaders of public opinion amongst illiterate masses, Mullahs (Priests),
village headmen, tribal chiefs, etc.;
4. “Labor leaders and army officers.” 216
The first target group is said to have been of significance because it had a vital interest in
preserving the integrity of Iran and because “if they could be stirred to more positive action
would represent the strongest possible rallying point for all anti-communist elements.” 217
Despite the restricted access to this target group, USIS was to work through Ambassador
213

Ibid., 7-8.
"United States Embassy, Iran Despatch from Loy Henderson to the Department of State."
215
"United States Embassy, Iran Cable from Edward C. Wells to the Department of State: Motion Pictures - ProSoviet Feature Film North Star," December 28, 1950, (Washington, DC: National Security Archive),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/docs.htm.
216
"United States Embassy, Iran Despatch from Edward C. Wells to the Department of State: IIA: Country Plan,"
April 28, 1952, (Washington, DC: National Security Archive), 1-2,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20060.pdf.
217
Ibid., 1.
214

54

Henderson to achieve maximum influence. The other three populations were deemed important
because they represented “the public opinion molders.” 218 The second group also comprised
those sectors of Iranian society that were most active in the nationalization of the oil movement
and who were more susceptible to communist propaganda.
While much of the USIS programming targeted the elite sectors of the society and the
opinion leaders, the Voice of America represented a propaganda apparatus accessible to the
general public. The VOA had initiated its Farsi Service on March 31, 1949, as its first postwar
radio service in the Middle East. 219 The station operated in two intervals during the Shah’s era,
initially from 1949 to 1960 and later from 1964 to 1966. VOA programs resumed operation after
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and continue to broadcast today.220 Following President
Truman’s abolition of the Office of War Information in late August 1945, the State Department
gained direct supervision over the activities of the Voice of America. 221 The Office of
International Information (OII) within the State Department was directly responsible for all VOA
programs and dictated the content to be broadcast. 222
VOA “country” programs, including the Farsi Service, did not have autonomy as to what
they could put on the air; instead, they had to abide by the policy guidance that “flowed twice or
more daily, via telephone, telegraph, and mail, from the Policy Guidance Staff of the State
Department’s Office of International Information in Washington DC, to the Policy Control Staff
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of IBD [i.e., the International Broadcast Division then located in New York City].” 223 In
addition to these “Daily,” “Overnight,” and “Special Guidance Notes,” IBD employees were
briefed by the Policy Control Staff twice daily, in the morning and in the afternoon, about how to
play different stories. 224 The staff at VOA Farsi Service received additional instructions from
the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the Tehran USIS facility about the issues and events that merited
prioritization and received guidance as to what stories to “play up” or “play down” based on the
USIS and the embassy’s appraisal of audience reaction to broadcasts and U.S. policy. 225
According to Deborah Kisatsky’s study of VOA Farsi programs in 1949-1953, VOA
broadcasts focused on three themes: “straight news” focusing on the Korean War, “special
feature” programming about American culture and way of life, and anti-communist
propaganda. 226 Throughout all these programs, VOA “described America’s desire for world
peace, collective security, and global prosperity,” while, at the same time, reporting on Soviet
intentions to threaten world peace and international harmony. 227 The anti-communist features
and reports did not hesitate to directly attack Soviet leaders as “evil, power hungry, and
determined to transform most of the world into a slave labor force in order to achieve global
domination.” 228
VOA also publicized American aid programs exclusive to Iran, showcasing them as
examples of American generosity. In the duration of the oil crisis, American officials “professed
complete neutrality in the affair.” 229 In the heat of the oil controversy, Ambassador Henderson,
as quoted by Kisatsky, advised, “Stick to hard news stories. In view of the present emotional
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state of the Iranian mind and increased anti-U.S. commentary in the press, we believe this to be
particularly important at the present juncture.” 230 In a matter of months, the U.S.-sponsored
coup that overthrew Mosaddeq’s government in favor of the puppet government of Zahedi would
reveal the hypocrisy of America’s respect for Iranian sovereignty and its willingness to sacrifice
Iranian independence and national interests for the preservation of the interests of the United
States and its allies in the Middle East.

August of 1953 – CIA Stages a Coup
The CIA coup against Mosaddeq comprised, among other things, a massive propaganda
campaign “to create, extend, and enhance public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadeq (sic)
and his government.” 231 This propaganda campaign is presently analyzed using Jowett and
O’Donnell’s 10-stage system of propaganda analysis as outlined in the methodology chapter. As
the preceding sections have illuminated the context of the propaganda campaign, this section will
focus on the other nine stages. Where relevant, several stages are grouped under the same
heading.

The Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda Campaign
During the final months of the Truman administration, U.S. and U.K. government leaders
agreed that Mosaddeq represented the single most important impediment to the settlement of the
oil crisis on terms that took into account the interests of the Western powers. This premise
resulted in a unified U.S.-U.K. policy to replace Mosaddeq before his government collapsed due
to economic failure, which would have resulted in an extremely unstable political environment
that would have made Iran most vulnerable to the Soviet Union. 232
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The United States and Britain picked General Fazlullah Zahedi as Mosaddeq’s
replacement because, according to CIA appraisal, he represented “the only figure in Iran
currently capable of heading a new government who could be relied upon to repress SovietCommunist penetration.” 233 The coup was said to be exceptional in that it was the first one
against “a head of government having powerful popular following.” 234 As a result, to achieve
success, the coup was preceded by a massive black propaganda campaign with the intention of
creating, extending, and enhancing “public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadeq (sic) and
his government.” 235
As such, the propaganda campaign mainly aimed to bring about agitation, turmoil, fear,
and discontent among the public so that they would be roused to go against the government of
Mosaddeq or, at the least, to refrain from actively supporting him. The propaganda campaign
attempted to manufacture the belief that Mosaddeq was pro-communist and that he wanted to
abolish the monarchy in favor of a communist government. According to the final operational
plan of the coup, the propaganda campaign was believed to be of “real value to the mutual
interests of U.S. and U.K.” even if the military coup failed since, at least, it would have made
“the position of Mossadeq (sic) increasingly vulnerable and unsteady.” 236 Therefore, although
the full aim of the campaign was to remove Mosaddeq, at the minimum it had the purpose of
making his government vulnerable so that later actions could mitigate his policies or eventually
result in his downfall.
Several themes were to be used in the propaganda campaign especially in the articles,
broadsheets, and pamphlets the U.S. personnel drafted and translated into Farsi. The first theme
underscored that the public and the elite should come to believe that Mosaddeq favored the
233
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Tudeh Party (Iranian communist party) and the USSR. This, according to the operational plan,
was to be evidenced through “black documents.” 237 Another theme stressed that not only did
Mosaddeq favor the Tudeh, but he was an outright “enemy of Islam” since he advocated
communist aims. 238 The next line of propaganda incriminated Mosaddeq with “deliberately
destroying the morale of the Army and its ability to maintain order.” 239 Other themes included
the following: Mosaddeq is actively colluding with the Soviets by removing army control of
Iranian tribal areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. He aims to facilitate the Soviet takeover of the
northern provinces. The next propaganda theme alleged that “Mossadeq (sic) is deliberately
leading the country to economic collapse.” 240
Given Mosaddeq’s popularity, the operational plan also deemed it necessary for the coup
press and publicity material to hammer the point that Mosaddeq has become a corrupted
politician thirsty for power: “Mossadeq (sic) has been corrupted by power to such an extent that
no trace is left of the fine man of earlier years, and he now has all the repressive instincts of the
dictator.” To increase the effectiveness of these themes, U.S. personnel were instructed to make
a final line of propaganda that Mosaddeq “has been the unwitting victim of his unscrupulous
personally ambitious advisors.” 241 Through an intense propaganda campaign, the United States
and Britain hoped Mosaddeq’s popularity would subside to establish conditions ready for the
eventual military coup that was to follow.
While the Shah had to operate as the focal point of the opposition against Mosaddeq, the
CIA knew that “… the Shah would act only with great reluctance but he could be forced to do
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so.” 242 To achieve compliance, a separate personal propaganda campaign was set up to induce
the Shah to play his role. To realize this purpose, the Shah had to be assured of the joint U.S.U.K. nature of the coup, that both governments put their complete support behind the Shah in
opposition to Mosaddeq, and that the United States would offer no aid while Mosaddeq was in
office. The Shah eventually signed the documents prepared by CIA as a result of “relentless
pressure” the CIA “exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome an entrenched attitude of
vacillation and indecision.” 243 The Shah was warned that if he did not cooperate, the United
States and Britain would not sit idly to see Iran become a target of communist intrusion, that the
coup will go on without him, that he would be responsible for the repercussions of his inaction,
and that his dynasty would soon come to an end.

Identification of the Propagandist and the Structure of the Propaganda
Organization
The United States and Britain together provided the funds for the project, drew up the
plans for the execution of the coup, and put their intelligence assets in Iran to the service of the
coup. The United States, however, was the sole implementing agent in this regard since Iran had
earlier cut all relations with the British. Also, all measures were taken to ensure that U.S. overt
policy conformed with the objectives of the propaganda campaign. 244 In this regard, Donald
Wilber said, “The Americans were placated and allowed to run things as they pleased,” and the
British agents were ordered to follow CIA directions. 245 Moreover, all propaganda material for
the coup was prepared by the CIA team, and the eventual implementation of the massive
propaganda campaign was carried under the supervision and direction of the U.S. personnel.
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Wilber, an American Orientalist writer and CIA spy, headed the psychological operation
team. Thus, the U.S. government served as the prime propagandist. The U.S. government as
propagandist was assisted by a handful of Iranian CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) principal agents and informants, the Shah, a handful of Iranian generals, the purchased
members of Majlis (Iranian parliament), the paid Iranian newspapers (such as Shahed, Dad,
Setareh Islam, Asia Javanan, Aram, Mard-i-Asia, Mellat-i-Ma, and the Journal de Tehran.), and
the U.S. prestigious press. (As will be mentioned later, the Wilber history mentions the New York
Times and the Associated Press in this regard.) While these elements assisted U.S. propaganda
aims, only a handful had knowledge of CIA operations. In many occasions, the services of the
mentioned operatives were purchased by funds made available through the U.S. and U.K.
governments. 246
In the face-to-face campaign to induce the Shah’s cooperation, according to Wilber,
Asadullah Rashidian served as the British special representative, and General Norman
Schwarzkopf Sr. (former head of the U.S. Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie) served
as the special representative from the United States. His son, Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., would
later become commander of the Coalition Forces in the Gulf War of 1991. Schwarzkopf Sr. was
chosen for this task because he was already “well known to and admired by the Shah.” 247 Shah’s
“forceful and scheming twin sister” Ashraf was chosen to “prepare” the Shah for the reception of
the U.S. and U.K. representatives and to induce him to sign the firmans (royal decrees)
dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi. 248
Asadullah Rashidian and his brother (Seifullah) were well-known British spies, and it is
extremely unlikely for the secretive British SIS to have used them as its main representative in a
246
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covert operation against Mosaddeq. 249 Interestingly, the operational plan of the coup did not
mention Asadullah’s name; rather, it referred to the British representative as “the leader of the
British group” only. 250 Abdullah Shahbazi, an Iranian historian, is of the belief that the term “the
Rashidian brothers” is just a code name for special British SIS agents and that the actual British
representative to the Shah was none other than Sir Shapour Reporter, who was a family friend of
the Shah and who had previously served as Queen Sorayyah’s English teacher. 251
Shahbazi refers, among other things, to Reporter’s official biographical document as
evidence of the plausibility of his opinion. According to the document, Sir Shapour Reporter,
who was a longtime British SIS agent, was appointed by the British to serve as a special political
advisor to U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson for a period of three years during the oil crisis. The
document further asserts that Reporter had the principal responsibility from the British SIS to
supervise “the field operations” that led to the downfall of Mosaddeq. 252 Upon the termination
of his mission, Reporter received U.S. citizenship and lifetime membership in the U.S. State
Department to serve as a special political advisor at the U.S. Tehran embassy’s political section.
Sir Shapour was also a reporter for the London Times, U.S. News and World Report, and other
newspapers not mentioned by name. 253 Thus, his reporting was an additional propaganda asset.
What makes Shahbazi’s claim more plausible is that the Wilber history at one point refers to “the
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three Rashidian brothers” while the actual Rashidian brothers were two. 254 Thus, it is likely that
“Rashidian” stands for all those British agents whose identity was not to be revealed.
Early in April of 1953, Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station Roger Goiran
were given authority to spend $1,000,000 in any way they found necessary that would contribute
to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddeq without further notice. In the preliminary support
stage to the coup, General Zahedi, the U.S. and U.K. choice for next prime minister, was given
$50,000 to win the support of additional friends and influential persons to expand his circle of
political and military supporters. These funds were provided to create the impression among
Zahedi’s contacts that the Shah was supporting Zahedi by the provision of funds. Meanwhile,
CIA and SIS teams drew up operational plans for the coup in a series of meetings in Nicosia,
Beirut, and London. 255
The final operational plan made Zahedi responsible to select his director of press and
propaganda who could also serve as his deputy prime minister to ensure the continuation of
propaganda in favor of the new government. This person “must [be] acceptable to the United
States and the United Kingdom,” 256 Zahedi was told. Esfandiar Bozorgmehr was chosen for this
post. Bozorgmehr was a newspaper reporter and, at the time of Mosaddeq’s government, had a
close relationship with publishers of many of Tehran’s newspapers. Thus, his services were
critical to the propaganda campaign. 257 The operational plan also indicates that CIA and SIS had
compiled a list for “the proposed cabinet of Zahedi.” 258 This list, however, is not provided in the
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Wilber history. The operational plan was signed on July 1, 1953, by Prime Minister Churchill of
England and on July 11, 1953, by President Eisenhower. 259
As the U.S. leading team had an Orientalist view of Iranians, they dictated the steps that
were to be taken to carry out the coup. Wilber writes in his history, “It was felt that every effort
should be made to bring the rather long-winded and often illogical Persians into a position where
each one knew exactly what specific action was required of him.” 260 The coup was directed
under the authority and supervision of Kermit Roosevelt Jr., the grandson of President Theodore
Roosevelt. Roosevelt came to Tehran on July 26, 1953. The coup initially failed on August 15th
after Mosaddeq’s government was informed of the coup through a leak. During the next few
days, a second coup eventually brought down the government of Mosaddeq on August 19th. 261

Media Utilization Techniques
Under the supervision of Wilber, the CIA team prepared a considerable number of proShah and anti-Mosaddeq articles, broadsheets, cartoons, and pamphlets, focusing on the themes
described above. A special courier delivered this material to the Tehran station on July 19, 1953.
On July 22, the station began distributing the material to CIA agents. The CIA mainly employed
the services of paid newspapers to place press and publicity material it had earlier
manufactured. 262 According to Wilber, one newspaper owner, for example, was given a
“personal loan of some $45,000 on signed notes in the belief that this would make his organ
amenable to our [CIA] purposes.” 263 A separate propaganda campaign employed the prepared
pro-Shah material in Iran’s north-western province of Azerbaijan, the Tudeh’s stronghold.

259

Ibid.
Ibid., 16.
261
Ibid.
262
Ibid., 20.
263
Ibid., 26.
260

64

In addition to the pre-planned propaganda themes, the CIA team prepared new material
for the press as events transpired. On July 14, when the opposition in the Majlis was growing,
mainly as a result of CIA funds, Mosaddeq directed the deputies supportive of him to resign so
he could then dissolve the Majlis. Some 28 deputies resigned. To bypass constitutional
restrictions, Mosaddeq organized a referendum on the dissolution of the Majlis, citing that the
will of the public should supersede that of the monarch. This event supplied the CIA-paid press
with additional propaganda material. Some 20 newspapers that, according to Wilber, were at
this time in “violent opposition” to Mosaddeq orchestrated on the theme that the referendum was
unconstitutional. Given a new opportunity to attack Mosaddeq, the papers made use of some 15
CIA-prepared anti-Mosaddeq cartoons. The CIA team requested the State Department to ensure
that the U.S. press reflected the CIA press campaign against Mosaddeq. The State Department
was to place “inspired articles” in the U.S. press. 264

Special Techniques to Achieve Success
As part of the propaganda campaign, the United States echoed the main anti-Mosaddeq
themes in its overt policy toward Iran. High ranking U.S. officials cut down on their contacts
with the officials of the government of Mosaddeq. In May 1953, for example, Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles bypassed Iran in his tour of the Middle East to show United States lack of
support for Mosaddeq’s government. 265 Similarly, Ambassador Henderson left Iran for
Washington and then for Beirut on June 3, 1953, and was absent during the duration of the
propaganda campaign. His very absence was considered to be “an important factor in the war of
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nerves which was to be conducted against Mossadeq (sic).” 266 Henderson returned to Tehran on
August 17, after the initial failure of the coup.
As another example, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission General Frank McClure was
instructed “to appear less friendly” with officers who were pro-Mosaddeq. 267 Moreover, the
propaganda campaign made effective use of several statements by top U.S. officials that
reiterated the propaganda themes that associated Mosaddeq with the Tudeh Party and that made
clear that no U.S. aid was forthcoming. Based on CIA suggestion, Secretary of State Dulles
made the following statement at a press conference on July 28: “The growing activities of the
illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Government has caused
our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran.” 268
Also, on August 4, while addressing the Governors’ Convention in Seattle, President Eisenhower
pointed out that the United States would not tolerate a communist Iran.
Bribery, black propaganda, and terrorism were some of the other special techniques used
to increase the campaign’s effectiveness. Bribery was used to solicit support from key actors.
Beginning on May 20, 1953, the CIA team was authorized to spend one million rials a week
(about $11,110) “in purchasing the cooperation of members of the Iranian Majlis.” 269 This was
in addition to the $1,000,000 that the station had received in April.
Through the use of black propaganda and terrorist attacks, the CIA team attempted to
rally religious leaders against Mosaddeq. CIA agents distributed forged statements in the name
of the Tudeh Party that threatened the targeted religious leaders “with savage punishment if they
opposed Mossadeq (sic).” 270 CIA agents also made threatening phone calls to some of theses
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leaders in the name of the Tudeh and bombed the house of one of them. The CIA apparently
wanted to carry out terrorist attacks on a wider scale as the plan for the coup shows. According
to the operational plan, “On the appointed day, staged attacks will be made against respected
religious leaders in Tehran,” with the intention to incite other religious leaders to blame
Mosaddeq for the assaults. 271 These offensives were to be supplemented with a propaganda
campaign publicizing “the U.S. station fabricated documents which prove and record in detail a
secret agreement between Mossadeq (sic) and the Tudeh, with the latter promising to use all their
force in support of Mossadeq (sic) and against the religious leaders, the Army, and the
Police.” 272
The use of bast – or seeking sanctuary – was another special technique that the coup
planners used to maximize the manufactured reality of widespread opposition to Mosaddeq. The
practice of bast is a traditional Iranian “form of symbolic protest regarding individual treatment
by the state or another powerful figure.” 273 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, bast
became a political strategy whereby political dissidents occupied symbolic spaces, such as
mosques, the parliament, and telegraph stations, in order to publicize their political movements.
This practice was effectively employed in Iran’s Constitutional Revolution in which a group of
12,000 to 14,000 bazaaris (merchants) took sanctuary in the British embassy. 274 Bast was used
to show that the opposition was greatly fearful of Mosaddeq’s retaliatory actions because of their
opposition to Mosaddeq. According to Wilber’s history of the coup, anti-Mosaddeq Majlis
members were directed to take sanctuary in the Majlis. 275
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In short, the CIA propaganda campaign made use of every available means for attacking
Mosaddeq. Using fear appeals, the massive propaganda campaign attempted to influence the
Iranian general public to withhold the support that they had hitherto given to Mosaddeq. Special
attention was given to influencing opinion leaders that would in turn have substantial influence
on different sectors of the Iranian public. Despite all these measures, the military coup initially
failed. On August 15, a few hours before the military stage of the coup, General Riahi,
Mosaddeq’s chief of staff received information about the coup. The coup was aborted, and the
Shah fled. 276

The Second Try
Upon the failure of the coup, the CIA team initiated a second propaganda campaign “to
convince the Iranian public that Zahedi was the legal head of the government and that Mossadeq
(sic) was the usurper who had staged a coup.” 277 In this second round of propaganda, the CIA
used the U.S. media as a legitimating source. The CIA sent a message to the New York
Associated Press from the Tehran embassy stating, “Unofficial reports are current to the effect
that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one dismissing Mossadeq (sic)
and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him.” 278
CIA agents also arranged for two New York Times reporters in Tehran to see Zahedi’s son
Ardeshir, who served as the liaison between his father and the CIA and later became the son-inlaw of the Shah. Ardeshir showed them the original firman that named Zahedi as Prime Minister
and also gave them copies of the firman. The station then prepared a public statement for
General Zahedi, which he signed, and distributed copies along with copies of the firman to
foreign correspondents, local newspaper reporters, and army officers. The statement, in part,
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read, “Be ready for sacrifices and loss of your lives for the maintenance of independence and of
the monarchy of Iran and of the holy religion of Islam which is now being threatened by infidel
Communists.” 279 The statement was later used by an AP reporter.
The Tehran station sent out propaganda guidelines to U.S. stations in “Karachi, New
Delhi, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul, and Beirut that the Zahedi’s government was the only legal
one.” 280 Meanwhile, rumor spread that the coup was staged by Mosaddeq’s government in order
to give it a pretext to move against the Shah and abolish the monarchy. CIA agents put out a
broadsheet that “documented” the rumor that Mosaddeq had arranged the coup to force out the
Shah. Several of the paid newspapers, including Dad and Shahed, were put to the service of the
new line of propaganda.
On August 17, the opposition newspapers, including Dad and Shahed, publicized the CIA
propaganda that the coup was Mosaddeq’s plot to remove the Shah. Figure 5 is an image of the
front page of the August 17th copy of Shahed, which was the official newspaper of the
Zahmatkeshan Party (The “Toilers” Party). The headlines on this page read as follows:
“Mosaddeq’s coup d'etat show is still to continue,” “The government’s faked coup d'etat for
changing the regime,” “The horrific specter of bullying and communism haunts Iran,” “To
complete Mosaddeq’s coup d'etat [i.e., the referendum to dissolve the Majlis], they brought about
this coup d'etat. Our party opposes any coup d'etat against the constitutional parliamentary
regime,” “A puppet show: How the coup d'etat plot was revealed,” and “People! Don’t you be
fooled. The coup d'etat is the second stage of the referendum comedy.” 281
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Figure 5. The front page of the anti-Mosaddeq Tehran-based newspaper Shahed dated
August 17, 1953 282
282
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While CIA propaganda aimed to conceal the true nature of the coup, Tudeh papers, such
as Shojat, reported that the coup was backed by the United States as the plans for the coup had
gone into effect after General Schwarzkopf met with the Shah. The Central Committee of the
Tudeh Party issued a statement blaming the coup on “Anglo-American intrigue.” 283 Another
pro-Mosaddeq newspaper, Niruye Sevum (The “Third Force”), which was the official newspaper
of a Marxist non-Tudeh political group of the same name, reported on the coup in similar terms.
Pro-Mosaddeq ex-Majlis members, including ex-deputies Mousavi, Dr. Sayyid Ali Shayegan,
Engineer Zirakzadeh, Engineer Razavi, and Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi, gave speeches in
the Majlis square. These speeches attracted crowds and were broadcast over Radio Tehran.
“The speakers attacked the Shah and demanded that he abdicate.” 284 Mosaddeq’s foreign
minister, Fatemi, wrote two anti-Shah editorials in the Tehran-based Bakhtar Emrooz (“Today’s
West”) newspaper. Scattered Tudeh and pro-Mosaddeq groups demonstrated in the streets. A
picture of demonstrators shows them carrying a banner that read, “The Shah is the main director
of the conspiracy and his house is the conspiracy’s headquarter.” 285
According to Gasiorowski, CIA had direct involvement in the apparent activities of the
Tudeh in the day following the coup. 286 On the evening of the day after the coup, CIA agents
Jalili and Kayvani were supplied with $50,000 to finance their anti-Mosaddeq propaganda
campaign. On the morning of August 19th, CIA agents arranged for more propaganda.
Thousands of broadsheets carrying copies of the firmans appeared in Tehran streets as more
newspapers printed copies. Wilber names the following newspapers in this regard: Shahed, Dad,
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Setareh Islam, Asia Javanan, Aram, Mard-i-Asia, Mellat-i-Ma, and the Journal de Tehran. 287
The first four also ran a CIA concocted interview with Zahedi to the effect that “his government
was the only legal one in existence.” 288
CIA agents also arranged for a black Tudeh mob to march into Tehran downtown.
Genuine Tudeh members joined the concocted Tudeh demonstrations. As a result, Tehran was
entrenched in havoc. 289 CIA agents Jalili and Kayvani instigated the Tudeh demonstrators to
ransack the Pan-Iranist headquarters in Tehran. 290 Also, they led “gangs of alleged Tudehites on
the streets with orders to loot and smash shops on Lalezar and Amirieh streets whenever
possible, and to make it clear that this was the Tudeh in action.” 291 All this was done with the
propaganda aim of instilling in the general public the fear and hatred of “Tudeh terrorism.” 292
Wilber notes that this chaotic situation and the openly anti-Shah declarations of Mosaddeq’s
government were instrumental in perpetuating the CIA propaganda line. 293 CIA agents
galvanized a group of pro-Shah people that were gathering in the bazaar. CIA agents took
leadership of the preceding groups and incited them to set fire to the offices of pro-Mosaddeq
and Tudeh newspapers as well as to ransack the headquarters of the Iran Party.
Truckloads of pro-Shah military personnel (mainly of the disbanded Imperial Guard)
spread in critical areas of Tehran. Trucks and buses were used to take mobs to key areas of the
city, seizing the central telegraph office, the Ministry of Press and Propaganda, and Radio
Tehran. 294 Two-hundred people were killed in fierce fighting between pro-Mosaddeq and antiMosaddeq forces at the residence of the prime minister. Mobs ransacked Mosaddeq’s house and
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sold its belongings to the passersby. Another 100 people were killed elsewhere in Tehran. 295
Mosaddeq surrendered to Zahedi’s forces the next day on August 20, 1953.
U.S. propaganda objectives were realized. Under General Zahedi’s government,
hundreds were prosecuted including many communist Tudeh Party leaders and high ranking
members of the National Front political group. Mosaddeq’s minister of foreign affairs, Hossein
Fatemi, was among the ones executed. Mosaddeq was tried for treason on November 8, 1953, in
a military tribunal and sentenced to three years in solitary confinement followed by house arrest
in his native village of Ahmadabad. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company resumed operation as a
consortium of Western companies, with exclusive management and full rights to the output of
Iranian oil to 1994. American companies received 40 percent of the shares, and the British
Petroleum Company (as AIOC was renamed in 1954) received another 40 percent with $510
million in compensation. Of the remaining 20 percent, 14 percent of the shares went to Royal
Shell and six percent went to the French state company. Giving up the control over its oil
industry, Iran acceded to a 50-50 profit sharing settlement. 296
Two weeks after the coup, a State Department telegram underscored that the United
States was now confronted with three propaganda problems: “a. charge [that] U.S. had hand [in]
deposing Mosadeq (sic), b. charge [that] Zahedi [is a] U.S. tool, c. developing myth [that]
Mosadeq (sic) [is the] Iranian grand man.” 297 To address these problems, the State Department
noted, “Agency plans reiterate, re a. and b. above, U.S. policy [is] non-interference [in] internal
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affairs of others.” 298 A 1954 National Security Council directive (NSC 5428) asked that U.S.
psychological programs in the Middle East include the following element:
Convince local leaders and peoples that the age of Western imperialism is over; and that
Western positions are being willingly readjusted in an enlightened manner and with full
respect for the national independence and sovereign equality of the Near Eastern states as
rapidly as the interests of security allow. 299
What the 1953 CIA coup in Iran demonstrated, however, was that Western imperialism had gone
undercover.
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CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSIONS
Any analysis of the 1953 coup would be incomplete without attention to the internal
realities that allowed the covert action to succeed and their implications. The case of Iran’s
nationalization of its oil industry shows that indigenous cultural forces, most notably religion,
were critical factors in bringing about the public cohesion needed to gain nationalistic goals. The
ulama (religious scholars), led by Ayatollah Kashani, played a key role in the mobilization of the
masses to support the nationalization of oil and Mosaddeq’s person as a leading figure in the
struggle.
Mosaddeq’s lack of appreciation for the mobilizing value of religion was a significant
pitfall that scattered his support base. After Mosaddeq came back to power in July 21, 1952,
mostly due to the support of Ayatollah Kashani, he gave some degree of freedom to the Tudeh
Party (the Iranian communist party) to organize and publish newspapers. In doing so, he was
playing the communist card aiming to convince the United States that if the U.S. failed to
support his government, the Tudeh would eventually rise to power. This policy had an
unintended byproduct: he alienated his religious constituency. In his memoirs, Mohammad Taqi
Falsafi, a prominent clerical figure at the time of Mosaddeq, says, “The situation after the 30th
Teer [July 21st], especially in the last months, became so that the religious people came to think
that Mosaddeq was paving the way so that the Tudeh would come to power.” 300 Mosaddeq
resisted pressure from the religious factions in society to restrain the activities of the Tudeh and
lost their support.
The CIA readily used this opportunity to increase the rift between Mosaddeq, his allies,
and a significant portion of the masses. The themes for CIA black propaganda well underscore
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the significance of eliminating the religious constituency that had hitherto supported Mosaddeq’s
policies and actions. The fact that the CIA had to resort to black propaganda and forged
documents in associating Mosaddeq with the Tudeh and creating an image of him as an antireligious political figure shows that such an association was more a perception than reality.
Nonetheless, Mosaddeq’s failure to disassociate himself from the propagated allegations was one
of the factors that ensured the successful permeation of U.S. propaganda.
From the 1953 coup experience, the implication follows that internal unity is an essential
factor in the realization of the goals of nationalist movements, especially in face of foreign
opposition. Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru, Mosaddeq’s counterpart, wrote to him a
few weeks prior to the coup pleading him to unite with his former allies including Ayatollah
Kashani, Hossein Makki, and Mozaffar Baghai. Nehru, according to Makki, expressed the view
that this solidarity was essential to contain plots in the making. Nehru warned that the crushing
of nationalization in Iran would be a blow to such movements in other third world countries as
well. He furthermore asserted that Mosaddeq’s allies were like stairs he had taken to rise to
power. He could choose to either keep them intact so as to gracefully descend from power when
necessary or dismantle them only to fall tragically in case of his removal. In reply, Mosaddeq
sent a message to Nehru asking him not to interfere in Iran’s affairs. 301
In addition to disunity, Iran’s case shows that dependency paves the way for external
powers’ interference in the internal affairs of the developing countries. The 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran was in large measure a movement to free Iran of its dependence on all
external powers. One of the major mottos of the revolution was “Na sharghi, na gharbi,
jomhourie Islami:” Neither East, nor West, an Islamic republic. The years of great power
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rivalry, the plunder of Iran’s natural resources, the crushing of the nationalization of oil
movement by the CIA-sponsored 1953 coup, and the U.S.-backed monarchical dictatorship that
followed had convinced Iranians that self-sufficiency and non-alignment with external powers
were key to Iran’s independence, development, and progress. As in the earlier years of
Mosaddeq’s government, religion was a unifying factor critical to the success of the revolution,
but this time it gained prominence over nationalism.
Two years after the demise of Mosaddeq’s government, nationalist leaders of Egypt
(President Gamal Abdel Nasser), India (Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru), and Yugoslavia
(President Josip Broz Tito) instituted the idea of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an
international organization of states seeking to resist formal alignment with or against any of the
two superpowers. NAM was founded in April of 1955, and, as of 2009, it has 115 members. 302
The creation of NAM showed the realization that genuine independence from all power blocs
was key to supporting the national interests of the developing countries in the face of great power
rivalries. The unity of developing countries is essential in empowering them to resist foreign
interference and overcoming dependency on hegemonic powers. Otherwise, third world
countries’ development would become conditional to the interests of those powers.
This thesis showed how U.S. policy in Iran during the early Cold War years, exemplified
by its propaganda policies, embodied a utilitarian mentality in which case the ultimate objective
of securing an upper hand over Soviet Union justified all means. Securing Western control over
the Iranian oil supply figured prominently in achieving this superiority. Far from looking for a
partner in the war against communism, the United States wished to achieve its ends in the region
by using Iran and its resources as means to an end, actively interfering in the internal politics of
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the country. Because of this mindset, gray and black propaganda dominated U.S.
communication programs directed at the Iranian public. Ironically, such activities were carried
out without the slightest indication of remorse on the part of the United States.
Frustrated with the failure of three years of negotiations to contain a full-blown Iranian
nationalization, the United States decided to use its CIA assets to bring about the downfall of the
government of Mosaddeq. The United States got all that it wanted through the 1953 coup. The
coup brought about a de facto denationalization of Iranian oil industry by handing back the
controlling shares of the industry to Western powers. An intransigent nationalist government
was replaced with a reliable client state. The apparent success of the coup made it a model for
future CIA covert operations, and Wilber’s history of how the mission was accomplished was
intended to be a blueprint for similar CIA conspiracies to come. 303 In reality though, what
appeared to be complete victory for the United States set the stage for decades of anti-American
sentiment culminating in Iran’s struggle in 1979 to bring down the monarchy and with it Iran’s
servitude to Western interests. In effect, the coup had backfired. The thinly disguised
imperialistic U.S. policies in Iran greatly damaged Iranian trust of the United States.
This study also revealed the centrality of propaganda in U.S. foreign policy. In August of
1953, the same month as the coup, the Eisenhower administration established the United States
Information Agency, further institutionalizing the role of propaganda in advancing U.S.
objectives around the world. The United States has, however, tried to contain the blowback of
its early Cold War propaganda policies and activities in part by rebranding them as public
diplomacy and “democracy promotion” and by mainstreaming some of the activities formerly
carried out by the CIA. In the early 1980s, a congressional act created the National Endowment
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for Democracy, 304 as a paradoxical government-funded non-governmental organization, “to
promote favored politicians and political parties abroad,” to use the words of Representative Ron
Paul (R-Texas). 305 A recent example is the 2002 NED-backed aborted coup against Venezuela’s
President Hugo Chavez. 306
In Iran in the post 9/11 years, according to a recently completed dissertation by Foad
Izadi, the United States has sought to use all its public diplomacy assets, including the services of
the NED, to bring about the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. 307 What is clear is that
propaganda, dressed as public diplomacy, still plays a central role in U.S. foreign policy,
especially after the 9/11 attacks. The United States continues to use its informational
infrastructure in influencing the internal political affairs of unfriendly countries. By doing so, it
is neglecting an important reality: when powerful countries act surreptitiously, all in the name of
national interest, their relationship with the victimized nations eventually tends to suffer from a
trust deficit.
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